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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The natural-radiation environment for the IUE orbit is sufficiently
severe to cause a significant possibility of interference, degradation,
or failure for unprotected or sensitive items. Consequently, the
Radiation and Shielding Study for the IUE was performed to provide
technical advisory services to ensure integrity of parts and material
exposed to energetic particle radiation for the IUE scientific
instruments, spacecraft, and subsystems.
1.1 IUE SPACECRAFT, MISSION, AND ORBIT
The International Ultraviolet Explorer is intended to fill the need for
an ultraviolet astronomical observatory for use primarily as a national
and international research facility (Reference 1). Its general
characteristics are:
e Delta Launch
e 45-cm UV telescope with echelle spectrograph
e Three-to-five-year lifetime
e Eccentric synchronous orbit
e Three-axis control with one-arc-sec pointing
* International guest observer facility
The scientific aims of the IUE are as follows:
* To obtain high-resolution spectra of stars'of all spectral types in
order to determine more precisely the physical characteristics of
these stars.
* To study gas streams in and around some binary systems.
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1.1 (Continued)
* To observe at low-resolution faint stars , galaxies, and quasars,
and to interpret these spectra by reference to high-resolution
spectra.
* To observe the spectra of planets and comets as'these objects
become accessible.
* To make repeated observations of objects which show variable
spectra.
* To define more precisely the modifications of starlight caused by
interstellar dust and gas.
The IUE spacecraft is made up of the following subsystems:
* Mechanical subsystems
o Communications subsystem
e Command subsystem
o Data-handling subsystem
c Power subsystem
e Stabilization and controls subsystem
o Scientific instrument subsystem
The basic configuration of the spacecraft is shown in Figure 1-1.
Most of the electrical subsystems are mounted on the main platform
and upper platform. The scientific instrument subsystem includes the
spectrograph, telescope and the experimental electronics. Some
characteristics of the scientific instrument are shown in Table 1-1.
A view of the spectrograph assembly is shown in Figure 1-2. The
locations of the various cameras are shown in Figure 1-3.
2
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TABLE 1-1 IUE SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENT
TELESCOPE
Type Ritchey Chretien
Aperture 45 cm
Focal Ratio F/15
Image Quality 1 arc-sec
Acquisition Field 10 arc-min diameter
SPECTROGRAPHS
Type Echelle
Detector Proximity focussed converter plus
SEC vidicon camera
Camera 1 Camera 2
Entrance Apertures 3 & 10 arc-sec 3 & 10 arc-sec
High Dispersion
e Wavelength range 1180-1990A 1860-3005X
e Resolving power 104 -1. 5 x 104
e Limiting magnitude* 7 7
Low Dispersion
e Wavelength range 1120-21601 1750-3250A
o Resolution 6X 6A
e Limiting magnitude* 12 12
*Limiting magnitudes estimated for 30 minutes exposure on a BOV star.
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1.1 (Continued)
The figures discussed above are not revised to show the design 
changes;
however, they illustrate the general spacecraft configuration.
An eccentric synchronous orbit was chosen for the IUE (Reference 2).
This orbit provides a weight advantage of 62 pounds over the 
fully
circularized inclined synchronous orbit to permit a spacecraft 
weight
of 809 pounds. Parameters of this orbit are given in Table 1-2.
A comparison of the earth's magnetic flux lines in relationship to
the eccentric orbit and a circular orbit is shown in Figure 1-4. The
magnetic L-shells relate to the trapped particle radiation intensity.
-7
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TABLE 1-2 NOMINAL ESO PARAMETERS (MISSION ORBIT)
APOGEE HEIGHT, ha = 45,600 km (24,625 nmi)
PERIGEE HEIGHT, h = 25,970 km (14,025 nmi)
SEMI-MAJOR AXIS, a = 42,164 km
ECCENTRICITY, e = 0.233
INCLINATION, i = 28.7 DEGREES
PERIOD, T = 23,93 HOURS
NODE = DEPENDS ON MISSION -CONSTRAINTS
ARGUMENT OF PERIGEE = DEPENDS ON MISSION CONSTRAINTS
NODAL REGRESSION = -4.8 DEGREES PER YEAR
ARGUMENT OF PERIGEE RATE = +7.8 DEGREES PER YEAR
GROUND TRACK (TENTATIVE) = TEARDROP SHAPED, TILTED
TOWARD NORTHWEST; NORTH-
BOUND EQUATOR CROSSING AT
+47 0 W, SOUTH-BOUND AT +88 0 W
8
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1.2 RADIATION ANALYSIS METHOD
The tasks in the IUE Radiation and Shielding Study were to:
o Provide radiation degradation assessment on all parts and materials
and advise on their acceptability for the IUE mission.
o Identify those critical parts and materials requiring radiation
testing and provide test plans and parameters.
o Conduct shielding surveys of scientific instruments, spacecraft,
and subsystems design configurations and advise on shielding
requirements for radiation-sensitive parts and materials.
o Provide on-call quick advice over entire 18-month term of the
contract.
Additional effort was expended to perform a detailed shielding analysis
to determine and justify shielding-material thickness requirements for
each side of every subsystem component or component stack. Data from
previous satellite experience also was analyzed to provide baseline
data for particularly sensitive IUE parts.
The salient features of the radiation analysis were:
o Evaluation of IUE environment
o Evaluation of material and piece-part degradation
o Evaluation of optical sensor degradation and interference rates
10
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1.2 (Continued)
o Application of results of these evaluations to the prediction of
the IUE spacecraft system performance degradation, preparation of
test requirements, and determination of shielding requirements
Inputs used for this study program were the spacecraft description,
design information, and trajectory definition. The following tasks
were performed: radiation environment levels were defined in terms
suitable for vulnerability analysis; screening was performed to
identify those materials and components that are not significantly
degraded by the radiation environment; the remaining materials and
components were analyzed in greater detail. The performance of
detailed circuit analysis was not within the scope of this program.
The task of determining.the necessary data for the probably degraded
parts and materials included selection of appropriate test data from
existing test results; determination of degradation or failure thresh-
olds from test data and damage equations; estimation of degradation
to the extent possible for types of parts and materials having no
test data; and definition, in cooperation with Goddard, of relevant
system-related failure criteria.
The cases for which test data were inadequate were identified and
tests proposed.
The classes of items receiving analysis emphasis because of their
expected radiation sensitivity were semiconductor devices, optical
sensors, and materials. The IUE semiconductors were organized by
subsystem and component into categories and problem areas associated
with each category were identified. Optical sensors were analyzed for
11
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1.2 (Continued)
degradation of critical elements and interference. The spacecraft
construction materials were classified by generic failure thresholds
and the application and general location of the materials were
examined to facilitate identification of the possibility of problem
areas.
Failure thresholds for the various generic categories of piece parts
and materials were used as a basis for establishing permissible
internal-environment levels for the associated spacecraft component.
Potential exceptions to the categorization were defined to.the extent
possible, and appropriate recommendations were made. The existing
shielding was determined, and the additional shielding to provide the
required internal environment was calculated.
12
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2.0 RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
Energetic electrons and protons of the earth's radiation belts, and
solar protons comprise the penetrating radiation environment of
principal concern for the IUE spacecraft. Solar ultraviolet radia-
tion, in conjunction with. solar x-ray activity increases total
ionization, but is of concern only for spacecraft surface effects.
The intensity and energy of trapped protons.and electrons are described
in a series of publications by J. I. Vette and Co-workers (Reference
3). Solar and galactic cosmic ray intensities and particle types to
be expected during the IUE mission are estimated in Reference 4, 5,
and 6. The .solar UV and x-ray intensity are given in Reference 7.
The actual particle flux and fluence incident on the spacecraft depends
on the trajectory of the spacecraft in the earth's magnetic field.
An estimate of these environments is obtained by the use of several
computer code systems (Reference 8 and 9). The penetrating energy
spectra, energy deposition, and displacement profiles in materials are
then calculated by appropriate radiation transport codes for the
incident particles. This calculation procedure is described in the
following section.
2.1 RADIATION ENVIRONMENTAL CALCULATION METHODS
The two orbits examined in this study were a circular, synchronous
altitude mission inclined at 28.70 with a parking longitude of 470W,
and an eccentric synchronous orbit with a perigee of 25,970 km,
apogee of 45,600 km, inclination of 28.70, initial perigee at -150
longitude, and an geographic equatorial crossing point of 470W. These
trajectory parameters are then combined with the trapped radiation
models in computer code systems which evaluate the flux and fluence
13
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2.1 (Continued)
of particles incident on the spacecraft during the mission.
Stassinopoulous (Reference 9) has used the Goddard Space Flight
Center computer system UNIFLUX to analyze the circular inclined
synchronous orbit and an orbit similar to the eccentric synchronous
orbit in some detail. This study used his results, where possible
and the Boeing SPARES computer to evaluate the differences between
the eccentric synchronous orbits studied by Stassinopoulous and
the current IUE eccentric synchronous orbit. Peak flux values
per orbit were obtained from trajectory analysis results of
UNIFLUX and SPARES, and AE-4 electron model environment. The
long-term average integral electron energy spectra for the inclined
circular and eccentric synchronous orbits are shown in Figure 2-1.
Also shown is the long-term average integral spectrum encountered
at the spacecraft deepest penetration in the earth's magnetic field
on the eccentric synchronous orbit, which is near L = 5.0 at the
geomagnetic equator. Long-term averaged orbit-integrated flux
values are used for the mission total electron dose calculations,
while appropriate fluxes at each point along the orbit are used
for interference calculations. As the actual electron flux at any
point along the IUE trajectory is strongly time dependent, varying
with both local time and solar activity, the 90% flux values taken
from the AE-4 model environment were used. This means that 90%
of the time the interference will be less than calculated. Similar
considerations hold for trapped proton fluxes but their energy
is low enough to result only in near surface ionization dose.
Radiation transport calculations required to describe electron and
proton penetration characteristics are done with codes from the
SPARES system, the electron Monte Carlo code ELMCD and the proton
.14
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FIGURE2-1 ELECTRON FLUX AT SYNCHRONOUS, ECCENTRIC SY29CHRONOUS
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2.1 (Continued)
penetration code HEVPEN. The calculational methods used in these codes
are discussed in detail in Reference 8. Basically, the incident
electron or proton differential energy spectrum is transformed into
the energy and angle dependent flux at various depths in the shield
material. The penetrating spectrum can then be used to calculate
absorbed dose, displacement damage, or any other energy-dependent
parameter of interest.
2.2 TRAPPED PARTICLE ENVIRONMENT
2.2.1 Electron Dose
The yearly electron dose behind aluminum or magnesium shields of
various thickness has been calculated by ELMCD for the circular and
eccentric synchronous orbits. The ESO curve is shown in Figure 2-2.
The spherical value is the dose calculated at the center of a sphere
of the indicated thickness, while the slab value is the dose under a
slab of the indicated thickness, with the incident flux taken as
isotropic in the half space. Calculations are made using 1000
incident electron histories sampled from the appropriate energy
spectrum with a uniform distribution, and the curves given are smoothed
from the Monte Carlo results. These yearly doses are calculated from
the long-term average flux, and the actual dose rate at any time
depends on the orbital position of the satellite, the local time, and
the previous level of solar activity and resulting trapped electron
flux variations.
16
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FIGURE 2-2 TRAPPED ELECTRON YEARL Y DOSE, ECCENTRIC SYNCHRONOUS ORBIT
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2.2.2 Electron Flux
Electron penetration calculations were required for the evaluation of
interference levels in the cameras and fine error sensor. For these
calculations the ELMCD code was used to determine the penetrating
number and energy spectrum of the electrons through MgF 2 and mu metal,
as well as the backscattered spectrum from SiO 2. These results are
shown in Figures 2-3 through 2-6. For these calculations it was
necessary to account for the change in intensity and spectral shape
as a function of orbital position.
2.2.3 Trapped Protons
The trapped protons are of such low energy in the'circular or eccentric
synchronous orbits that their dose contribution is of concern only
for spacecraft surface effects. Figure 2-7 shows the dose contribu-
tions from trapped proton, trapped electron, solar UV and X-rays in
thin layers of material. These values are of interest for materials
effects.
2.3 SOLAR PROTON ENVIRONMENT
2.3.1 Solar Proton Criteria
The annual solar proton environment anticipated during the maximum of
the next solar cycle, Cycle 21, is given in Reference 6.
Considering the length of the IUE mission, 3 to 5 years, and consider-
ing the possibility of a large solar proton event, such as the
August 1972 event, it is appropriate that a solar proton environment
of 10 times the annual mean environment be used so that this
18
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2.3.1 (Continued)
environment will result in approximately 95% confidence for not
exceeding the solar proton criteria during a 3-year mission, using
the prediction method of J. King (Reference 4) for the flux greater
than 30 MeV.
2.3.2 Solar Proton Damage Evaluation
The absorbed dose and displacement damage from the annual and criteria
solar proton spectra are calculated by the use of the proton transport
code HEVPEN. Figures 2-8 and 2-9 show dose and displacement values for
aluminum spherical and slab shielding. The absorbed dose is given for
a silicon absorber, while the 20 MeV equivalent proton fluence is
calculated by a product integration of the penetrating proton energy
spectrum and the energy dependent displacement cross section, and
then presenting the displacement damage in terms of a 20 MeV proton
fluence. The displacement cross section used was taken from the work
of Baicker (Reference 10).
24
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3.0 MATERIALS ANALYSIS
3.1 MATERIALS SURVEY
The IUE materials list, dated 29 May 1974, has been studied to
identify materials which might suffer unacceptable radiation damage.
In making such an assessment, certain generalizations must necessarily
be made because test data may only be available on generically similar
materials (Reference 11 and 12). The damage thresholds cited in the
graphs below are generally the radiation level at which changes are
first observed. Usually the change is in one of the important
.physical properties, such as tensile strength. Electrical properties
usually change more slowly than physical properties (in the initial
stages at least). In several organic insulators,-the loss tangent
changes more rapidly than the resistivity. Obviously a judgment as
to which property is the most important cannot be made on the basis
of a materials list alone. It is also necessary to make an engineering
judgment on the consequences of small changes in properties. For
example, a small change in a/z of a thermal-control coating-is much
more serious than a small change in the mechanical properties of wire
insulation.
There might be secondary consequences of some kinds of degradation
caused by radiation or heat. Irradiated teflon produces fluorine
and fluorine compounds, and polyvinyl chloride produced hydrogen
chloride, for example. It seems likely that the lack of moisture,
the vacuum environment, and the slow release of corrosive gases should
prevent corrosion of the electronics or the optics in a satellite, but
there is no information on this subject.
27
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3.1 (Continued)
A few materials, specifically teflon and nylon, exhibit markedly
improved stability to radiation in vacuum or a nonoxidizing atmos-
phere. As much as two orders of magnitude improvement has been
reported. In the tabulation of damage thresholds, a more conservative
improvement of one order of magnitude has been taken.
Fillers and reinforcing materials usually improve the radiation
resistance of organic polymers, but this is not always true.
Titanium oxide is reported to decrease the radiation resistance of
nitrocellulose lacquers, whereas carbon black increased the resistance
of the otherwise identical formulation. Nitrocellulose may be unique
because it is relatively unstable, but it should be observed that the
damage level shown below for paints is that of the generic organic
base because references have not been found to the radiation effects
on the specific paints listed for the IUE.
Therefore, materials have been grouped by generic types and a range
of dose given for the threshold of damage, moderate damage and severe
damage.
Material damage thresholds for the various categories have been
defined as follows: Category 1 -- greater than 1010 rad (C);
Category 2 -- greater than 108 rad (C); Category 3 -- between 107
and 108 rad (C); Category 4 -- less than 107 rad (C).
Metals and ceramics have been placed in the first category. The
damage thresholds for these materials are so high, greater than 1010
rad (C), that no further analysis is necessary. Other materials are
placed in. this category because they serve no function after launch.
Marking ink and wire labels are examples.
28
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In the second category, materials have been identified which have
damage thresholds of greater than 108 rad (C). These materials would
be completely satisfactory if shielded by 5 mils of aluminum (of the
order of .03 gm/cm 2) and probably of low risk if shielded by 1 to 3
mils of aluminum. In this group are polyolefines, polyimides, filled
epoxies, polyurethanes, and polyalkenes. The range of damage to these
materials is shown graphically below. Generally, reinforcement and
fillers, such as fibre glass, improve the resistance of these
materials significantly.
Polyolefin (heat & rad stab) ////(?)
Polyimides ////////
Fiber glass-epoxy
Polyurethane V-?IA
Polyal kens . (?)
Rad (C) io 7  108 109 1010
I 1 Incipient to mild.
Mild to moderate.. Often satisfactory.
Moderate to severe.. Limited use.
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In the third category are those materials with a damage threshold
between 107 and 108 rad (C). These materials are nylon, unfilled
epoxies, and oriented polyesters such as mylar. Materials in this
category should certainly survive behind shielding >.012 inches of
aluminum (.08 gm/cm2).
Nylon (vacuum) ?
Epoxy (unfilled) /
io6 7 .o8 9106 10 108 10
Nylon was somewhat uncertainly placed in Category 3 above because it,
along with teflon, which is the fourth category, shows improved
resistance to radiation in an oxygen-free environment. There are
some contradictions in the published resistance to radiation for
nylon and teflon.
Teflon (TFE-type), silicone elastomers, and acrylics are the least
radiation-resistant materials on the list, and have been placed in
the fourth category. The threshold of damage for these materials is
5 x 106 rad (C) or less. They would be certainly safe behind .040
inches of aluminum (.28 gm/cm2) shielding.
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Acrylic
RTV silicone and primer
Teflon (vacuum),
5 6 7104 10 10 10
TFE teflon is one of the least radiation-tolerant materials in general
use. In air, it shows significant damage well below 105 rad (C), but
is reported to be approximately two orders of magnitude more resistant
in an oxygen-free environment.
Severely damaged teflon is still a good electrical insulator if there
is no mechanical stress. For example, a teflon insulated wire,
irradiated to a high dose in a vacuum chamber auxilliary to an acceler-
ator, retained good electrical insulation until an attempt was made to
move the wire slightly, at which time the teflon crumbled into a
powder. The stresses to which acrylics and RTV silicones are subjected
should be reexamined. Of relevance is the fact that the adhesive on
tapes and other materials are acrylics.
The cement for the solar cell covers is a possible problem. Recent
work by L. Fogdall, at The Boeing Aerospace Company, indicates that
the RTV 500 series cements tend to creep slowly over the surface of
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the covers where they are evidently polymerized by radiation and, on
long missions of one or more years, might decrease the solar cell
power output by as much as 10 percent. It is expected that the other
silicone elastomers would perform similarly.
The acrylics, elastomers, and teflon are considered possibly suscep-
tible only if operated under a large, long-term mechanical load where
cracking, separation, or crumbling could cause a critical failure.
In addition, the heat dump resistor adhesive may merit testing in a
radiation environment because of its exposed position.
The particular IUE materials classified in the fourth category are:
the Scotch #5, Permacell EE7240, and Macbond 0200 (9626) tapes which
use acrylic adhesives; the Ben Hur 1062-C sleeving, RTV-566 with
SS-4155, Stycast 265111, and RTV 3116 which are silicon elastomer
compounds; and the many clearly identified items using teflon.
Engineering judgment is that all the materials except possibly those
in the fourth category will survive the mission because they will be
subject to fairly mild stresses, both electrical and mechanical.
There is significant shielding outside of most materials to reduce the
expected dose to near damage threshold and in most cases the materials
themselves provide at least some additional self-shielding because of
their thickness.
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3.2 ANALYSIS OF SELECTED MATERIALS
3.2.1 Transmission Optics
The coloring of glass, usually browning, by ionizing radiation is well
recognized, but the relative sensitivity of various glasses to discolor-
ation by radiation covers several orders of magnitude. The basic com-
position of glass and impurities or minor constituents all are impor-
tant factors in determining the degree of discoloration by radiation.
Much of the work on radiation coloring of glasses up to 1966 is dis-
cussed in Reference 13. Several authors, (Reference 14, 15, and 16)
have observed severe darkening in several optical quality glasses at
doses from 104 to 106 rad. Stabilized glasses are available, however,
in a good range of optical specifications. These are usually stabilized
by the addition of cerium, which seems to be quite generally applicable
as a stabilizing agent. Kleinpeter and Clare (Reference 14) describe
radiation tests on several compound lenses and optical glasses which
show that improvement of radiation resistance of 103 to 104 times that
of noncerium doped glasses is obtainable and useful transmission (~50
percent) was observed after 109 to 1010 rad doses on stabilized glasses.
Apparently the six-digit number and the Mil. G 174 specification only
specify the optical properties of optical glass and these specifica-
tions can be met by various compositions. It is, therefore, not
possibleto determine the radiation response from these specifications.
There are, however, Mil. Spec. cerium stabilized radiation-resistant
glasses. Table 3-1 shows cerium stabilized glass that optically
corresponds to unhardened six-digit and Military Specifications glasses.
This table does not cover all IUE glasses. It is recommended that
radiation resistant transmission optics be specified for the IUE.
However, it should be noted that changes in the refractive index of
cerium stabilized glass have been observed (Reference 17). A An of
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TABLE3-1 OPTICAL GLASSES
INDUSTRY 6 DIGIT MIL G 174 MIL SPEC CE STABILIZED
573-574 .BAK 1 BAK1G12
517-642 BK 7 BK7G14
517-642 BK 7 BK7G25
603-364 F2 F2G12
636-353 F6 FG20
691-547 LAKN9 LAK9G15
578-416 LF 4 F4 G34
581-409 LF 5 LF 5G15
717-295 SF 1 SFlG7
689-312 SF 8 SF8G7
646-341 SF 16 SF16G12
667-330 SF 19 SF19G7
623-569 SK 10 SKIOG10
613-586 SK 4 SK4G13
34
D180-18486-1
3.2.1 (Continued)
about +5 x 10-5 in the region of 0.5 p, after a dose of 106 rad(Si)
from a cobalt source (C060) plus 1015e/cm2 of 2 MeV ("3 x 107 rad), was
reported. This change may be significant for high resolution optics.
3.2.2 Metallized FEP Teflon
The data on changes in the solar absorption in metallized FEP teflon are
summarized in Reference 18 to late 1970, and newer data are given by
References 19, 20, and 21. Considering that these data represent
a fair variety of experiental conditions for space simulation as well
as flight data, the agreement between observations is good. It is
reasonable to conclude from these data that the worst case absorptance,
a, for a fluence of several times 1016 particles/cm 2, whether the
particles are protons or electrons, would bev0.20 and that a more
probable a is 0.17, for aluminized teflon. The initial a reported
for approximately equal thicknesses of teflon by various sources
varies from 0.08 to 0.135 and change in absorptance, 6a, from 0.04
to 0.13. From this it would seem that there are inconsistencies in
measurement and/or product, but if thermal analysis of the satellite
shows that a final a of 0.17 to 0.20 does not cause serious trouble,
aluminized FEP teflon is an acceptable material. In any case, no
satisfactory substitute seems to be available.
3.2.3 Hydrazine System
3.2.3.1 Hydrazine Decomposition
Hydrazine is decomposed by ionizing radiation into hydrogen and nitro-
gen. The yield at STP is reported to be of the order of 0.1 ml/M
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rad per gram H4N2, Reference 22 and 23.
The volume of the IUE hydrazine tanks was estimated to be approximately
7600 ml and from the sketches, they are assumed to be 1/2 full
containing approximately 3800 ml = 3800 gm. Thus one Megarad would
produce a maximum of 380 ml of gas, which would add little to the
pressure in the tanks. This volume of gas is an upper limit since
many of the electrons and protons penetrating the tank walls would
have ranges much less than the full thickness of hydrazine and the
expected total dose would be well below 106 rad in much of the volume.
3.2.3.2 Hydrazine Tank Diaphragm
The diaphragms in the hydrazine tanks may become somewhat degraded. No
specific data has been found on radiation damage to the ethylene-
propylene copolymer, but both polythylene and polypropylene suffer
undesirable changes in mechanical properties in the 107 to 108
rad (C) region. At 8.9 x 107 rad (C) polypropylene is reported to
have become brittle, lost all of its elongation and most of its
tensile strength. Polyethylene loses only about 25 percent of its
strength at the same dose. It is not known whether the copolymer
would be better or worse. The expected dose to the diaphragms is
of the order of 2 x 106 rad (C), and the acceptability of small
changes in diaphragm properties is not given. In view of the
importance of this part to the success of the mission, it is suggested
that the specific polymer to be used be tested to at least 107 rad (C)
if small changes in properties are significant.
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4.0 SEMICONDUCTORS
4.1 PIECE-PARTS
4.1.1 Electronics Survey
The assessment of the IUE electronics is based on piece-parts vulner-
ability. Detailed circuit analysis to determine specific margins and
electrical-failure criteria for each circuit application of the piece-
parts is beyond the scope of this analysis effort. This effort involved
no testing.
Piece-part types were categorized according to the types of construc-
tion which bear some relationship to their general response to radiation.
These categories are shown in Table 4-1. Wide variability in radiation
response within part types reduces accuracy of such a categorization.
The intent of the categorization is to permit establishment of a
reasonable lower limits on the environment levels which could cause
failure for each piece-part category. Hence the categories of piece-
parts used in particular system components provide the basis for
setting reasonable values for the vulnerability threshold of those
components. Shielding thicknesses were determined that reduce com-
ponent internal-environment levels to values less than these threshold
levels.
Semiconductor parts lists were abstracted from the available system
component parts lists supplied by NASA and categorized. The result
is summarized in Table 4-1.
The vulnerability thresholds for the various piece-part categories
were set using as much test information for the specific piece-parts
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.TABLE 4-1 ELECTRONICS SCREENING SUMMARY
pi-q -J ce _j CV _wL
SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT o oD < o >.
a-
COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM:
S BAND TRANSMITTER #1 X a, f 1
S BAND TRANSMITTER #2 X a, f 1
VHF TRANSPONDER #1 X. a 1
VHF TRANSPONDER #2 X a 1
COMMAND SUBSYSTEM:
COMMAND RELAY X X X 1, 4
COMMAND DECODER #1 X X ' X :1
.COMMAND DECODER #2 X X X .1
DATA HANDLING SUBSYSTEM:
MULTIPLEXER:
CONVERTER (PRIME) X X 1
CONVERTER (BACKUP) X X 1
DATAPLEXER (PRIME) X X e 1
DATAPLEXER (BACKUP) X X e 1
SUBPLEXER #1 X X e 1
SUBPLEXER #2 X X e 1
SUBPLEXER #3 X X e 1
SUBPLEXER #4 X X e 1
I!
TABLE 4-1 ELECTRONICS SCREENING SUMMARY (CONTINUED)
SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT C o C
co z: C) V)
COMPUTER:
POWER CONVERTER #1 a, f 1
POWER CONVERTER #2 a, f 1
CPM #1 X b 3
CPM #2 X b 3
MEMORY:
MEMORY #1 X a 1
MEMORY #2 X a 1
0 MEMORY #3 X a 1.
POWER SUBSYSTEM:
POWER MODULES (2TOT) X X a 1
MISSION ADAPTOR X X X 1
STABILIZATION & CONTROLS
SUBSYSTEM:
INERTIAL REFERENCE ASSY.
IRA SENSOR X f 1
IRA ELECTRONICS f 1
NUTATION SENSOR ASSY X f N.R.
CONTROL ELECTRONICS ASSY X X X X 1, 4
WHEEL DRIVE ASSY X ,X X X 1
TABLE 4-1 ELECTRONICS SCREENING SUMMARY (CONTINUED)
SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT c < 0,
SUN SENSORS AND PAS X N.R.
SUN SENSOR & PAS X X X 1
SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENT
SUBSYSTEM:
EXP. MECH MOUNTED
ELECTRONICS:
SELECTORS c NR
MODE SELECT MECH EL X X a 2
SHUTTER MECH EL X a 2
FOCUS MECH EL X a, d 2
EXPERIMENT ELECTRONICS ASSY X X. X X 1, 4
CAMERA ELECTRONICS BOX X X X 1
ACQUISITION CHM (2 TOTAL) X X f 1,4
SPECTROGRAPH CHM (4 TOTAL) X X f I, 4
FES HM X a, f 1, 4
FES ELECTRONICS X X X X 1
SUN SHUTTER SENSOR X NR
NOTES: a) ALL BIPOLAR ) LVT 1) 5 x 103 RAD (S) ELECTON DOSENOTES 2) 5 x 104 RAD (S) ELECT ON DOSE
b) ALL TTL e) AMI PMOS 3) 10'RAD Si)
c) DIODES ONLY ) NO P RTS LIS1 AVAILALE E E APP ICABLE ANALYSI ,l_) 5_x i___ ____ ___ iOPTICS -LA EE R )\O- C
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4.1.1 (Continued)
as available, supplemented to a considerable extent by test data on
similar piece-part types. The vulnerability thresholds should be set
as high as possible to minimize shield weight, balanced against risk.
The establishment of vulnerability thresholds by this approach
necessarily involves engineering judgment, and the assumption of
small, but non-zero risk. To minimize the risk involved in the use
of a generalized vulnerability threshold for the determination of
requirements on internal environment levels, appropriate radiation
test data is necessary. Test data is desirable on every potentially
vulnerable semiconductor piece-part type used in the system, on at
least a sampling basis, to identify particularly vulnerable piece-
part types. Such types can then be replaced, or spot shielded to
lower environment levels.
The vulnerability thresholds established for the semiconductor
categories are summarized below. The bases for these thresholds are
developed in later sections of this report. Piece-part testing and
screening are also discussed.
For bipolar transistors particularly sensitive device types have been
observed to degrade significantly at doses as low as 103 rad (Si).
A level of 104 rad (Si) is below roughly 95 percent of the device-
type failure levels, and may be used as the threshold level provided
the extremely vulnerable types are identified by test.- Further, 104
rad (Si) is also a reasonable threshold for both the bipolar linear
ICs and the MOS digital ICs. The bipolar digital ICs of the general
type used in the IUE have failure thresholds in excess of 10. rad (Si).
The silicon- controlled rectifiers have extremely variable total-dose
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response from part type to part type, and particular types can safely
be used only after radiation tests have demonstrated acceptable
thresholds.
Predicted displacement (proton) degradation for bipolar transistors is
given in Section 4.1.3. Displacement damage is not considered to
be significant for the other semiconductor categories, except for
unijunction transistors.
For the IUE environment, the vulnerability thresholds of diodes
(Reference 24) and passive piece-parts are sufficiently high so that
these piece-parts are not of concern.
4.1.2 Total Dose Effects
4.1.2.1 Total Dose Response Summary
Total dose response of semiconductor piece-parts has been surveyed
for the purpose of: 1) establishing minimum total dose hardness
levels for each semiconductor category or device type; 2) examination
of methods for identification of the most sensitive piece-parts of
a batch of parts of a particular type. Item 1 can be carried out
by using historical data, or better by using sample groups for
radiation tests. However, Item 2 methods involve radiation tests
of all the particular devices in question.
The radiation sensitivities of the various device categories listed
below can be expressed as probability plots as shown in the sketch.
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These curves are approximate and are presented to illustrate the
relative sensitivities of these categories to total dose.
Device Categories No. of Types in Each
1. Low-power bipolars 11
2. Medium power bipolars 14
3. Power bipolars 13
4. Linear bipolar ICs 17
5. Digital bipolar ICs 17
6. JFT 2
7. .P MOS digital ICs 14
8. CMOS digital ICs 56
9. CMOS Linear ICs 0
10. 4-Layer devices: SCRs, etc. 2
11. Diodes NR
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HIGH
i-I P-9,-
LOW
104 105 106
Notes on preceding sketch:
a. CMOS curve reflects the latest test data on the RCA devices by
Sandia.
b. PMOS curve reflects the Goddard test data on their own devices.
Corresponding data on AMI PMOS will be generated later by
Goddard.
c. Each of the bipolar curves represent the average of many types of
devices with an expected large scattering among the various types.
d. All curves represent worst-case bias conditions.
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A small sample (5 to 10) of devices from a particular parts type is
useful in defining the relative radiation vulnerability of that part
type. A log normal failure distribution can be assumed, and a lower
limit established for a given confidence and population proportion
as an indicator of a safe dose level for that part type. Particular
parts types which have an inadequate safety margin may not be
reasonably replaced or spot shielded. If these parts types have their
mean failure level above the internal environment level, a screening
technique to select the particular units of a device type which are-"
adequately hard may be useful. Total dose screening is difficult
because of the lack of suitable electrical parameters that correlate
well with total dose damage. Recent research has.established 100
percent irradiate and anneal (IRAN) as a possible technique. One-
hundred-percent IRAN involves irradiating all of the units of a
particular type to.the specification level, performing electrical
measurements of critical parameters on all units, rejecting the units
to recover their performance, and using the annealed units in the
system. This technique is reasonably effective, but is expensive,
and reliability effects remain to be determined.
Several total-dose test-program concepts are outlined below. They
vary in the level of detail and, consequently, the level of risk
varies accordingly.
Level-C Program--Small sample irradiation test representative device
types from MOS, linear, and four-layer device categories. These
devices should be the overall spacecraft shielding to provide the
desired hardness margin.
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Level-B Program--Perform Level-C testing. Also perform small sample
irradiation tests (no bias) on all other device types except bipolar
digital, JFET types, and diodes; then small sample irradiation retest
(worst-case bias) device types which do not have a large hardness
margin. Perform a trade study between adjusting overall shielding,
adding spot shielding, and replacing device types.
Level-A Program--Perform Level-B testing, and complete Level-B trade
study. Then 100-percent IRAN all device types with minimal margin.
Since 100-percent IRAN is planned for marginal types, a higher internal-
environment criterion may be possible.
4.1.2.2 Total-Dose Effects in Bipolar Transistors
Establishing total-dose thresholds for electronic systems containing
bipolar transistors is a difficult problem because of the erratic
nature of the total-dose-induced surface effect. Consequently,
devices within a given batch show a wide scatter in total-dose
response. The spread between devices of different batches and different
device types is even greater (spanning orders of magnitude). The
situation is further complicated by the fact that the total-dose
response is also a function of bias or operating condition of the
transistor during irradiation.
To establish the level of total-dose exposure below which no failures
are likely to occur in a system, it is necessary to know the details
of the circuit applications of each device type and the radiation-
response data for each device type (from the batch to be used) at
each operating condition within the circuit.
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However, in many applications such detailed analysis as discussed
above is not practical and complete data do not exist. The discussion
that follows presents an approach to proper perspective. Data have
been accumulated and analyzed for a large number of bipolar device
types both from Boeing test data and from other related published
data. These data include both npn and pnp transistors. Some of the
devices were operated actively during irradiation, while other types
were passive; however, the data have been treated without regard to
operating condition or construction. The only restriction placed on
the data is that the device type be a low-power silicon transistor.
All the device types fell within the range 300-mW to 800-mW power
dissipation. This approach is reasonable in that.devices within a
large system will consist of both npn and pnp types operating in a
variety of conditions. Generally, the tests reported included
groups of five to 20 devices. The mean failure level for the group
is the value considered in this analysis.
The results of this analysis for three different gain degradation
levels are tabulated in Table 4-2 and are plotted on a log-normal
distribution in Figure 4-1. The current of 1 mA was chosen as being
reasonable for the IUE circuitry. It should be noted that a reduced
current would reduce the dose level required for failure, while
generally an increase in current level increases the dose required to
produce failure.
The results indicate no apparent threshold for total-dose effects.
That is, failures may occur at doses of the order of 103 rad (Si) or
less. It should be noted that as the gain margin is increased, the
lower end of the curve is not changed significantly. The slope of
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TABLE 4-2 TOTAL DOSE FAILURE LEVELS FOR SEVERAL DEVICE TYPES
TOTAL DOSE LEVEL TOTAL DOSE LEVEL
DEVICE FOR B = 0.75 Bo DEVICE FOR B = 0.5 Bo
Rad (Si) Rad. (Si)
2N2487 2.2x10 3  2N2484 6x103
2N2369 5.0x10 3  2N2369 8x10 3
2N2222 1.lxl0 4  2N2222 5x104
2N1613 .) 1.3x10 4  2N1613 5xlx0 4
2N2946 2.0x10 4  2N2946 5x10 4
2N930 - : 2.2x10 4  2N930 -o 6x10 4
2N3347 3.0x104  2N930 (, 8x10
4
2N9302  ) 3.0x10 4  2N930 ( 1x10 5
2N1613 () 4.0xlO4  FS7966 1.2x10 5
2N930 0 4.OxlO4  2N2920 2.5x10 5
2N2219 4.5x10 4  2N2219 3.0x10 5
FS7966 5.0x10 4  2N1613 ( 3.0x10 5
2N2920 7.0xl0 4  2N2605 3.Oxl 05
2N1893 1.1x10 5  2N3347 4.0x10 5
2N2605 1.5x10 5  2N1893 1.0x10 6
2N1132 4.5x105  2N708 2.0x10 6
2N743 No Failure 2N1132 3.0x10 6
2N743 No Failure
TOTAL DOSE LEVEL
DEVICE FOR B = 0.258 o
Rad (Si)
2N2484 3.Ox104
2N5 NOTE: .Flagged types represent data from
2N930 2.3x0 5  different experimenters on different
2N2222 4.0x10 5  batches of devices of the same type.
2N2605 6.Ox10 5
2N2920 3.0x10 6
2N1132 1.0x10 7
2N3347 1.4x10 7
2N1613 3.5x10 7
2n743 No Failure
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the line changes but the probability of failure at low-total dose
is not improved very much. This observation reflects the nonlinearity
of the total-dose effect in transistors. That is, as total dose is
increased, the gain degradation from surface effects is initially
rapid, then saturates (shows small increase in damage) at higher dose
levels. The change in slope of the plots in Figure 4-1 reflects
this saturation; however, the softer devices apparently reach failure
for /0o = 0.25 before saturation commences and, hence, the dose
range over which failure occurs for the three criteria is not large
(as is the case for harder devices for which the damage saturates at
a lower level). It is important to note that the graph shows
cumulative percentage failures among different device types, rather
than for units within a particular type. Assuming the device types
used are representative, these data indicate that one percent of
the device types within a system are likely to be vulnerable at 103
rad (Si), apparently independent of failure criteria. At 104 rad (Si),
5 percent of the device types within a system are likely to be
vulnerable for a failure criterion of 25 percent remaining gain.
Table 4-2 indicates that a system can be hardened to levels greater
than 105 rad (Si) by parts-type selection..- However, total-dose
hardening must also accommodate the significant variability in the
degradation of units within a particular device type. Even so, the
benefits of minimal radiation testing and parts-type selection are
considerable.
The bipolar transistors known to be used on IUE are listed in Table
4-3 with the associated test data where available. It is recommended
that the low-power devices (under one watt) be screened for total-
dose susceptibility by sample testing under active bias. The circuit
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TABLE 4-3 TOTAL DOSE FOR IUE TRANSISTORS
DOSE DOSE DOSE
DEVICE DEVICE RATING 't FOR FOR FOR
NUMBER TYPE (WATTS) MHz B/Bo=0.75 $/Bo=0.5 8/So=0.25 REMARKS
2N918 NPN Si 0.2 600 20 It is recommended that these
devices (Power <1W) be screened
2N3350(a) PNP Si60 150 for total dose susceptibility.Dual 0.2 60 150
2N3838 NPN-PNP Si
Dual 0.25 200 100
2N2920(a) NPN Si 0.30 60 300 8.0x10 4  2.-6x10 5  1.2x10 7  Applied physics lab data 1965
Dual
2N2848(b) NPN Si 0.36 15 175 2.2x10 3  6.0x10 3 3.0x10 4  August 1974 Boeing test data
2N3811(a) PNP Si 0.50 100 300
Dual
2N2060 NPN Si 0.50 50 50
Dual 4 5
2.8x10 4 8.5x10 4 8.0x10 5 Applied physics lab data 1965
2N2222A NPN Si 0.50 300 100 4x 4 5
.1x10   5.0x10 4.0x10 August 1974 Boeing test data
2N5338 NPN Si 0.60 30 30
2N2605 PNP Si 0.60 200 100 6.0x10 4 1.5x10 5 .8.0x105 August 1974 Boeing test data
2N2905A PNP Si 0.60 200 100 105 No Data No Data Boeing test data (active) 1970
2N2219 NPN Si 0.80 300 100 4.5x104 3.0x10 5  106 1967 Boeing test data
2N2219A NPN Si 0.80 300 100
2N3019 NPN Si 0.85 100 100 0
2N2854-2
(a) NPN Si 0.85 30 100
Electrons
MSC4003 Microwave Should be tested Protons
MSC4000 Devices
TABLE 4-3 TOTAL DOSE FOR IUE TRANSISTORS (CONTINUED)
DOSE DOSE DOSE
DEVICE DEVICE RATING t FOR FOR FOR
NUMBER TYPE (WATTS) MHz 8/ao=0.75 8/8o=0.5 8/8o=0.25 REMARKS
2N3636 PNP Si 1.0 150 50 In general, power devices,
2N3720 PNP Si 1.0 60 20 if used in a power application
2N4236(b) PNP Si 1.0 3 40 (that is high-current) are
2N3468 PNP Si 1.0 150 25 relatively immune to total
2N3444 NPN Si 1.0 175 20 dose degradation (i.e.,
2N3635 PNP Si 1.0 150 50 Boeing Test Data 1970 4x105 Rad(Si)). However,
2N3501 NPN Si 1.0 150 100 1.0x10 5 No Data No Data if they are used in low-
2N2658 NPN Si 1.25 20 40 current modes, they can be
2N1724/1 softer to total dose than
(a) NPN -Si 3.0 10 30 low-power high-gain devices.
2N4863 NPN Si 4.0 50 50 Based on these considerations
2N2034C NN Si 5.0 1 20 the circuit applications
(b) NPN Si 5.0 1 20
2N4150(a) NPN Si 5.0 15 40 of these devices should be
2N3375 NPN Si 11.6 500 10 examined.
2N1486(b) PNP Si . 25.0 1.2 35
2N3741(b) PNP Si 25.0 3 40
2N3749(c) NPN Hi
Freq 30.0
29B(b Si T (a) Significant proton damage
2N491B(b) NPN Si .UJT likely.
2N2814(a) NPN Si 70.0 15 40 (b) Severe proton damage likely
(c) If multiple emitter, should 0
2N5539-5 be tested for dose.M(c) NPN Si 100.0 20 25
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application of the power devices should be examined to determine if
any device is operating at current levels significantly less than the
gain peak. If so, those particular power devices also should be
tested.
4.1.2.3 Total-Dose Effects on Microcircuits
The microcircuits can be classified as MOS logic, bipolar logic, and
bipolar linear. There were no MOS linear microcircuits found to be
-used on IUE.
The MOS logic circuits used on IUE consist of RCACMOS, AMI PMOS, and
some NMOS used in the vidicon electronics.
A survey of the pertinent literature, References 25 through 38,
indicates that in general, small changes in device parameters begin
to occur at a level of 104 rad (Si), with failure at considerable
higher levels in some cases. However, the most recent data, for
RCA CMOS, indicate functional failure in the neighborhood of 3 x 104
rad (Si). J. Novelo (Reference 39) found failure at 3 x 104 rad (Si)
for the CD4011AK/1. R. Burghard (Sandia) tested CD4061 and CD4011
devices from RCA Findlay. These devices failed at 3 x 104 rad (Si).
J. W. Spaniol (JPL) tested a CMOS memory system made up of CD4000
series devices, and reports a 55 percent power increase at 2.2 x 10
rad (Si) and complete failure at 5.3 x 104 rad (Si). It seems
generally accepted that there has been a process change that has
reduced the failure of the RCA devices. D. Lokerson (NASA Goddard)
has found the prototype PMOS devices failing in the neighborhood of
3 x 104 rad (Si), also. No annealing of the PMOS was found. Tests
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of the production AMI PMOS devices are recommended. Tests of the
NMOS devices in the cameras are recommended also.
Based on the preceeding data, a failure threshold of 104 rad (Si)
for the CMOS seems reasonable.
A basis for total dose testing the RCA CMOS is given in Table 4-4.
The device types listed were selected to be the most representative of
all the types used in the IUE. The types listed are prioritized to
indicate the device types to be tested first. If variations in
failure levels between device types are small (within range of
statistical variation for a device type), only the priority AA and A
devices need be tested. Specific electrical test and measurement
details depend on the particular application of each device type.
The bipolar logic circuitry in the IUE is the 5400 series TTL type.
Reference 40, and Reference 41, which survey failure dose levels for
a wide variety of bipolar logic circuits, report failure levels in
excess of 107 rad (Si). Reference 41 shows failure levels of
4.5 x 108 rad (Si) for T2 L epitaxial NAND gates and 2 x 107 rad (Si)
for T2L RS flip flops. The piece-part package plus a nominal housing
thickness (0.040A1) is sufficient to reduce the dose level to less
than 106 rad (Si).
Bipolar linear circuits tend to show more variability than logic
circuits. Current Boeing test data on the LM108 and LM101 devices
shows input offset current and voltage to be out of specification in
the range of 3 x 104 to 105 rad (Si). The LM124 and LM139 devices
begin to degrade above 105 rad (Si). Data for the .A 741 (Reference
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TABLE 4-4 TEST CONCEPT FOR RCA CMOS
DEVICE FUNCTION PRIORITY
4046- PHASE LOCKED LOOP AA
4011 NAND GATE A
4027 JKFF A
4016 BILATERAL SW A
4047 ASTABLE MULTIVIB.. B
4013 D FLIP FLOP C
4001 NOR GATE C
4030 EXCL OR C
* MINIMUM SAMPLE SIZE= 5
PREFERRED SAMPLE SIZE = 10
e IRRADIATE UNDER OPERATING BIAS, TRIGGER AT NOMINAL RATE
* DETERMINE SIGNIFICANT ELECTRICAL PARAMETERS FROM.
RESPECTIVE DESIGNERS
* TEST AA AND A PRIORITY DEVICES UNLESS LARGE VARIABILITY
IN FAILURE THRESHOLD BETWEEN DEVICE TYPES IS NOTED
o IRRADIATE TO FAILURE IN COBALT 60 FACILITY
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40) shows no change at 104 rad (Si), with some degradation at 105
rad (Si). Thus, 104 rad (Si) is indicated to be a reasonable failure
threshold for the linear microcircuits. However, a risk is involved
when specific test data are not available for the particular linear
microcircuits used. Table 4-5 lists the IUE linear microcircuits.
Existing test data for linear microcircuits was found to be limited.
Consequently, additional linear microcircuit testing would reduce
this risk.
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TABLE 4-5 LINEAR BIPOLAR ICs
HA2700 HIGH-PERFORMANCE OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIER
SM105G VOLTAGE REGULATOR
pA741 FREQUENCY-COMPENSATED OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIER
SM109G-1 5V REGULATOR
pA715 HIGH-SPEED OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIER
LM105 VOLTAGE REGULATOR
LM108A OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIER
LM101AH/883 OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIER
ICH8500A JFET OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIER
/A723 PRECISION VOLTAGE REGULATOR
G2700 OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIER
OP747HM DUAL OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIER
pjA709A HIGH PERFORMANCE OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIER
SM107F-1 OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIER
SM10IF-1 OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIER
SE51OJ DUAL-DIFFERENTIAL AMPLIFIER
SM101G-1 OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIER
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4.1.2.4 Total-Dose Effects on SCR Devices
The Unitrode 2N3028 is the SCR type used in three places in the IUE;
the control electronics assembly (relay), the command relay, and the
Experiment electronics assembly (LVSW). There is a possible severe
problem associated with the use of SCR devices. Most studies of SCRs
show.thresholds near 104 rad (Si) or higher for small changes in
parameters (Reference 42). However, some tests (References 42, 43, 44)
where an SCR type (2N2323) was irradiated under bias with the SCR in
the off state, caused these SCRs to turn on during irradiation at levels
near 103 rad (Si). Data is insufficient to indicate how widespread
this behavior may be. Therefore, it is recommended that the 2N3028
device be irradiated under bias in the off state to determine if they
are unusually sensitive.
4.1.3 Displacement Effects
4.1.3.1 Proton Displacement Damage Effects in Bipolar Transistors
The proton displacement damage was calculated for three solar proton
levels for the IUE device types known, The proton levels are 3-year
fluences based on either a nominal (expected average) or 10 times
the nominal yearly fluence (spherical values) to provide a 95 percent
probable 3-year environment, Most displacement damage data is
obtained by use of a neutron environment. An energy dependent con-
version factor has been established to convert proton damage to
neutron damage. The equivalent 20-MeV proton levels are converted
to displacement damage equivalent neutrons by multiplying by 25, The
resulting values are shown following in Table 4-6.
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TABLE 4-6 PROTON SENSITIVE TRANSISTORS
S/B o:Predicted at:
ft/ ao 4.5 x1010  1.5xlO11 5x10O
TRANSISTOR (ft in MHz) n/cm n/cm 2  h/cm 2
2N3350 0.4 >.9 .9 .7
2N2920 0.2 >.9 .8 .55
2N2484 0.086 .85 .65 .4
2N3811 0.33 >.9 .87 .7
2N2854-2 0.3 .9 .85 .6
2N4236 0.07 .82 .6 .3
2N1724/1 0.33 .9 .86 .7
2N2034C 0.05 .77 .5 .25
2N4150 0.37 .9 .87 .7
2N1486 0.034 .7 , .45" .2
2N3741 0.07 .82 .6 .3
2N491B -- UJT -
2N28/4 0.38 .9 .9 .7
ENVIRONMENT (SPHERICAL SHIELDING) PROTON NEUTRON
95% .400" Al 6x109 P/cm 2  1.5x1011n/cm2
Nominal .400" Al 1.8x109p/cm2  4.5x10n/cm2
95% .140" Al 2xlO10 0P/cm2  5x1011n/cm 2
Nominal .140" Al 6x109p/cm2  1.5x10 11n / cm2
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4.1.3.1 (Continued)
The transistor degradation is expressed in terms of B/B , the ratio of
the gain after irradiation to the gain before irradiation. Table 4-6
shows those IUE transistors for which possibly significant degradation
is predicted. The gain degradation for at least the 1,5 x 1011 n/cm 2
level should be considered for acceptability, or better the 5 x 1011
n/cm 2 level, since it indicates the predicted degradation in the fully
shielded case (0.40 inch Al) for the 95 percent environment. The 0.400
inch case is included to show the relatively small effect of thicker
shields.
It should be noted that several transistor types indicate severe
degradation for the highest level. The acceptability of this degrada-
tion should be confirmed by the subsystem designers.
The 2N49B is a unijunction transistor used in the EEA converter. It
is potentially vulnerable to proton displacement damage.
4.1.3.2 Proton-Displacement Effects in Microcircuits
No problem is anticipated with displacement effects in any of the IUE
microcircuits. Typical damage thresholds are above 1013 n/cm 2 , equiva-
lent to 5 x 1011 P/cm 2 (Reference 40). The fully shielded IUE 95 per-
cent proton environment is 2 x 1010 P/cm 2
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4.2 SPECIAL DEVICES
4.2.1 Hall Devices
Hall devices are used in the IUE as mechanism position sensors, The
Hall device provided by Bell, Inc., is constructed of aluminum oxide,
indium arsenide, polyurethane, copper, and epoxy.
A four-terminal Hall-effect device behaves basically according to the
relationship.
V = R (I x B)
where V is the output voltage, R is the Hall coefficient, I is the
control current, and B is the magnetic field. Of these terms, R is
the radiation-sensitive, parameters. The Hall coefficient is propor-
tional to the inverse of the number of ionized carriers/cm3. Reference
45 shows carrier density as a function of 4.5-MeV electron fluence.
Fluences of the order of 1015 4.5-MeV electronic/cm 2 are required to
produce significant changes in the carrier density (approximately 20%
at 0 = 1015 e/cm2). The effect of such changes on the Hall coefficient
was found to change approximately 50 percent (estimatation difficult due
to slope of graph) for 0 = 0.5 x 1015 el/cm 2,
The Hall device damage mechanism is a result of displacement effects.
The displacement damage from the belt electrons is negligible. The
displacement equivalent environment for the solar protons is required.
The device is apparently packaged in an approximately 0.1-inch thick
epoxy case which gives 0.05 inch on either side of the active element.
Assuming the epoxy to have a density of one, this gives 0.13 gms/cm2 of
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shielding. For the IUE mission, this gives an equivalent 20-MeV proton
fluence of the order of 3 x 1011 P/cm 2 (20 MeV) using the 95-percent
1
solar proton environment. Such a fluence, based on a r cross section,
is equivalent to ~1.5 x 1010 P/cm 2 of I-MeV energy, It has been
observed that one 1-MeV proton creates an amount of displacement damage
equivalent to ~400 4.5-MeV electrons (Reference 46) in silicon , Thus,
if one assumes a similar energy dependence for InAs, the equivalent
4.5-MeV electron fluence for the IUE mission should be -6 x 1012 (4.5
MeV) e/cm 2 . The energy dependence is expected to be similar, but
insufficient data is available to confirm this assumption, Therefore,
the Hall device should withstand the IUE environment with little
adverse effects.
4.2.2 Linear Voltage Displacement Transducer
Discussions with Hewlett- Packard established the internal electronics
for the Linear Voltage Displacement Transducer .(LVDT) utilizes discrete
bipolar transistors, type unavailable, which are placed in an annular
configuration around the transformer core. Thus a minimum estimate for
the shield thickness is the stainless-steel package (0.55 gm/cm 2 ) plus
the transistor cans (0.21 gm/cm2). Also, the transducer is sufficiently
thick so that the back half-plane can be assumed to be completely
blocked. The transducer mounting blocks approximately 70 percent of
the solid angle around the transducer, including complete shielding
of the transducer ends. Including the blocking of the back half-plane
approximately 15 percent of a sphere will be viewed by the transistor
chips through 0.76g/cm 2 Fe. Using the environment curve for Z-22,
shown in Section 7.1, the 4fr level is 2 x 104 rad (Si)/year, so that
3 x 103 (Si)/year or -104 rad (Si)/year, so that 3 x 103 rad (Si)/year
or ~104 rad (Si) per mission is accumulated by the transistors.
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Therefore, the LVDT is vulnerable only if a very sensitive transistor
is used (see bipolar total-dose degradation discussion). If the LVDT
is a critical item, it should be tested with active bias in the Cobalt
60 facility.
4.2.3 Mechanism Mounted Electronics
The mechanism-mounted electronics are contained in small packages
and consist of 2N2222 transitors, HA2700 amplifiers, diodes, and
passive components. Specific test data on these devices show that
5 x 104 rad (Si) electron dose is an appropriate shielding criterion.
Shielding to this electron dose level will allow a proton level of
2 x 010 P/cm2 . Test data for the 2N2222 and HA2700 amplifiers
also show that the corresponding displacement damage is acceptable
for these devices.
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5.0 SENSOR ANALYSIS
5.1 SENSOR CONSTRUCTION
5.1.1 UV Converter Construction
A cross section of the Proximity Diode is shown in Figure 5-1. The
MgF 2 window obtained from Harshaw Chemical has a transmission of >35
percent at 1215 A. The photocathode is a nicrome layer deposit on
the back of the window producing a 15 percent reduction in transmission
followed by a layer of Te giving an additional 15 percent reduction
in transmission and finally a molecular layer of Cs, The anti-halation
layer will reduce the photoelectron energy by 4 KeV, The'P11 phosphor
is 1 mg/cm 2 of ZnS (Ag) with a mean particle size of 4 to 10 microns
0
and an emission peak at 4460 A. With a 6-kilovolt bias and 1-watt
incident light at 2537 A the P11 phosphor produces an output of 4
watts. The Proximity Diode is potted with Echobond 24.
5.1.2 SEC Vidicon Construction
The outline of the SEC Vidicon is shown in Figure 5-2. The potenti-
ally radiation-sensitive element in the vidicon tube is the KC1 target.
The material thicknesses surrounding the target have been determined.
The front end of the camera module is covered by 1 mm of mu-metal
(0.85 g/cm2), and 1 mm of Aluminum (0.27 g/cm2). The vidicon wall is
1/8-inch ceramic (0.86 g/cm 2) in the vicinity of the target, 1/32-inch
Kovar (0.63) gm/cm 2) adjacent to the ceramic, and 1/16-inch glass
(0.42 gm/cm 2) on either side of the Kovar. Interference and damage to
the target will be considered.
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FIBRE OPTIC
OUTPUT WINDOW
MgF2 INPUT--
WINDOW:
0.1" THICK
P = 3.15
0.8 g/cm 2
2mm
Cs Te PHOTOCATHOD
P11 PHOSPHOR:
ZnS (Ag)
mg/cm2
BLACK ANTI-HALATION LAYER: 1000 A BLACK Al0
1000 A PURE Al
ABSORBS 4 keV
BX 8040-,4528 PROXIMITY DIODE
FIGURE 5-1 UVCONVERTER
/RG~ypc.
/Oit4pL' -
y.METAL 0.86 g/cm2
ALUMINUM 1 mm
0.63 g/cm2  0.86 g/cm2
1/32" KOVAR 1/32" KOVAR 1/32" KOVAR
1/8GLASS 1/16 GLASS 1/8" CERAMIC 1/16" GLASS
0.42 g/cm2 -- KC1 TARGET
Fo
FIGURE 5-2 SEC VIDICON TUBE
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5.1.3 Fine Error Sensor Construction
The Fine Error Sensor (FES) Head Module consists of an image dissector
tube, focusing coils, a mu-metal shield, and some of the associated
driving circuitry. It is considered that the material surrounding the
dissector tube is sufficiently thick that the only significant radia-
tion flux enters the dissector tube through the optical window. The
FES Head Module is mounted on the acquisition deck of the optical
unit, and views a front surface mirror, so that interference causing
radiation must be scattered into the FES by this mirror,
5.2 DAMAGE EFFECTS
5.2.1 P11 Phosphor Damage
Birks, Reference 47, states that ZnS(Ag) and ZnS(Cu) are damaged
identically by alpha particles and that the damage follows the equa-
tion
I/I 1 + AN
where I1 is the initial fluorescent efficiency
I is the final fluorescent efficiency
-22A is a damage constant = 4 x 10-14/particle/cm2
N is the particle fluence, cm-2
The equation was tested to 1013 alpha particles/cm2 , where a fluorescent
efficiency of 70 percent was observed. A 5 percent decrease in fluor-
escent efficiency would result from 1.25 x 1012 alphas/cm2 . Protons or
electrons would produce less damage, so that little damage should result
from the expected mission fluence of <1012 e/cm2 (through MgF 2 window).
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5.2.2 KC1 Target Damage
The mechanism of radiation damage in KCI has been studied extensively,
References 48 and 48, and the predominant mechanism for producing the
largest effect, the production of F centers by radiolysis, is an un-
usually efficient process. A small amount of radiation triggers the
release of energy stored in existing lattice defects, causing long
range lattice relaxations. Low energy electrons or even ultraviolet
radiation are as effective as more densely ionizing and more energetic
particles for causing radiolysis and radiolysis is of the order of
100 times more effective than displacement for producing damage in
"KCI. Therefore, it could be argued that an electron test .of the KC1
target is appropriate. Unfortunately, it is not clear that this kind
of damage is predominately the cause of the failure of the target to
hold charge or the cause of electrical discharges which cause pinholes.
Therefore, both proton and electron tests are indicated.
5.2.3 MgF 2 Window Damage
The production of optical absorption bands in MgF2 by ionizing radia-
tion and neutrons has been studied extensively and the experimental
results are described reasonably well in References 50, 51, and 52.
A theoretical analysis of the experimental results is given in
Reference 53. The results are complicated and can be summarized as
follows:
1. The principal absorption is centered at 2600 R and the absorption
bandwidth varies with temperature during exposure and is much
broader and more complicated with neutron exposure than with.
electrons or gammas. The effect of high-energy protons is not
discussed, but if one ventures a guess that the additional com-
plexity from neutrons is caused by displacement damage, high-
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energy proton damage may be more complicated than that by electrons
or gammas. There is also a secondary absorption band produced
0
around 3650 A by all types of high-energy radiation.
o
2. The extent of absorption produced at 2500 A depends on the dose
rate, the total dose and the temperature during exposure. No
absorption is produced at 150 OK and the absorption increases both
with increasing and decreasing temperature. The absorptivity
saturates between temperatures of 50 oK, and 200 OK but not outside
of this range.
0
3.. The 2500 A band can be annealed at 200 OK by. ultraviolet radiation
of the same wavelength, but the residual band is broadened and
o
there is a strong increase in the absorption at 3650 A. Light of
o
3500 A wavelength does not bleach this band.
4. The absorption bands can be thermally annealed at temperatures
greater than approximately 400 OK and the time-temperature rela-
tionship depends on total dose; the greater the dose, the more
rapid the annealing. After annealing at 800 OK there remains a
0
broad absorption band around 3000 A.
5. Combinations of thermal and radiation annealing are possible.
If high absorptivity is produced by radiation with the crystal
held at one temperature, then the temperature is changed to one
with a lower saturation level and ionizing radiation again applied,
o
the absorption in the 2500 A band will decrease to the absorp-
tivity saturation level associated with the second temperature.
6. The absorptivity depends on impurities. At low-dose levels
impurity (at least Mn) seems to increase the radiation sensitivity
and at higher levels to suppress it.
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Most of the data on which the above conclusions are based were taken
with doses between 1015 and 1017 MEV cm-3 , in the units used in the
references, and the observed optical absorption coefficients resulting
from these doses were in the range of 10 to 100 cm-1 , which is rather
strong absorption. Taking the stopping power of MgF 2 to be of the
order of 1.5 MeV cm-2/g for electron energies of the order of 1 MeV
and the density of MgF2 to be 3.1 (Reference 54), the conversion of
MeV cm.3 to electrons/ cm 2 = 4.751 or, in round numbers, 0.2 electrons
-2 -3 14 -2
cm /MeV cm 3  Thus an electron fluence of the order of 2 x 10 e/cm
0
would be expected to produce significant absorption in the 2600 A band.
14
Present spacecraft structure allows a yearly flux of the order of 10
el ectrons/cm 2 incident on the window. Heath and Sacher, (Reference 55)
have reported observing an approximately 60 percent increase in absorp-
tion at a fluence of 1014 1 and 2 MeV electrons cm-2 and Hass and
Hunter, (Reference 56) have reported an approximately 25 percent
increase in absorption for a fluence of 1015 electrons cm-2 . They
suggest that the lower sensitivity they observe is due to more pure
MgF 2 , but in consideration of the complexity of the effect this may
not be valid, or at least not a complete explanation. Sacher (Ref-
erence 57) reported no change in the transmission of MgF 2 resulting
10 -2
from a total exposure of 8.25 x 1010 protons/cm -2 evenly distributed
over 3, 3.8 and 4.6 Mev.
In conclusion, it is recommended that in order to have a high degree
of certainty that the MgF 2 window will not suffer more than a 10 per-
cent increase in absorption on a 5-year mission, the total electron
fluence should be kept below 1013 electrons cm-2 (at least 0.3 g/cm 2
shielding). This may be considered conservative in consideration of
the annealing mentioned above, as well as the uncertainty of the rate
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effect at low radiation rates, but the effects of protons are uncertain
and were not considered in the above discussions.,
5.3 INTERFERENCE EFFECTS
5.3.1 Fluorescence in the MgF2 Window and the P11 Phosphor
The peak orbital flux at the equator penetrating the 0.1-inch (0.8
g/cm 2) MgF 2 window is of the order of 105 electrons/cm2-sec. An
estimate of the ultraviolet photon flux incident on the converter
window was obtained as follows. Referring to the SDR, Volume 1,
-1 2
Figure 10.4-4 and Figure 10.4-2, a flux of F = 10- photons/cm 2-sec
0
A appears representative of the limiting capability of the long-
wavelength high-dispersion spectrograph. Assuming reasonable
values of obscuration and optical efficiency, and that the photons
in the spectrum are uniformly distributed across the window, the
ultraviolet photon flux at the window was calculated to be on the
order of 10 photons/cm 2-sec. A comparison of this photon flux
directly with the above electron flux indicates the possibility of'.
a severe signal-to-noise problem. The effectiveness of the electrons
for producing interference is evaluated below.
The P11 phosphor (ZnS (Ag)) is one of the most efficient materials
known for producing fluorescence when exposed to ionizing radiation.
The fluorescent efficiency is given by Birks (Reference 58) as 3 x
104 photons/MeV, or 34 eV/photon, Taking the stopping power to be
1.5 MeV cm2/g and the P11 thickness as 1 mg/cm2 results in a cal-
culated fluorescence of 45 photons/electron of the order of 1 MeV
in energy. Since the maximum electron flux through the 0.1-inch
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5 -1
MgF window is predicted to be slightly more than 10 electrons sec
cm , 'the fluorescence of the P11 phosphor is then predicted to be
at least 4.5 x 106 photons/cm2/sec in the most intense radiation
field expected if no shielding is provided, Taking an ultraviolet
to P11 photon gain of 20, this corresponds to an increase in equivalent
ultraviolet background of 2.25 x 105 UV photons cm- 2 sec I incident.
Therefore the predicted P11 electron interference is considerably
greater than the signal at limiting sensitivity for peak electron
rates.
Sacher, (Reference 51) reported very briefly that MgF 2 "phosphoresced"
outside of the visible light range, evidently in the ultraviolet,
when simultaneously exposed to ultraviolet and protons (3-4.6 MeV)
but no data were given. Fluorescence in the ultraviolet range to
which the CsTe photocathode is sensitive could cause objectionable
background. It is unlikely that much fluorescent-yield data in the
ultraviolet range of interest will be found in the literature because
the spectral range of interest for applications such as scintillation
counting is outside this ultraviolet range. Thus additional tests on
the fluorescence of MgF 2 are recommended. It should be stated that
organic materials such as a film of vacuum pump oil or fingerprints
might also fluoresce either under ultraviolet radiation or ionizing
radiation.
5.3.2 Cerenkov Radiation in the Cameras and Fine Error Sensor
The relativistic electrons present in the earth's outer electron belts
will produce photons in the window materials of the camera and Fine
Error Sensor (FES). To estimate the intensity of the Cerenkov radia-
tion the discussion of Reference 60 is used, along with previously
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developed electron penetration data for MgF 2 and SiO 2, The photon-
production rate for an electron of velocity v = C in a material
with an index of refraction, n, is given by
I = 1.53 x 10- 12 (1 - 2-2 ) dv photon/cm
gn
The normal to the radiation front makes an angle of
cost
nB
with the particle velocity vector.
For n = 1.39, the MgF 2 value, and a relativistic electron, B1, = 440o
22
The energy-dependent yield function, (1-1/2 n ) ranges from 0 at 224 keV,
.37 at 723 keV, up to ,46 at 2 MeV, Taking an average yield value of .4,
based on the shape of the penetrating-electron spectrum, and using a
0
wavelength band of 1200 to 3200A, the rate of photon production is ~160
photon/cm. The total 'path length of electrons in the MgF 2 window of
the spectrograph camera is estimated from the total energy deposited
in the window and from the average electron stopping power in MgF 2. A
peak track rate of 6 x 106 cm/cm 2 sec is estimated, This will then
result, for an average quantum efficiency of 10 percent in the CsTe
photocathode and a photon transmission efficiency of 50 percent, in an
electron production rate of 5 x 107 electron/cm 2 sec in the camera.
This rate is much greater than the penetrating-electron rate,
The FES, with a quartz window, n 1.48, a larger optical bandwidth,
and with exposure to only the scattered electrons would have a peak
electron production rate of 5 x 106 electron/cm 2 sec. The transmission
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efficiency of photons to the photocathode is difficult to calculate
exactly due to the multiple scattering of the electrons and the
resulting spread in Cerenkov emission angles, but the transmission
efficiency is unlikely to be so small as to cause a major reduction
in the interference estimates,
The FES multiplier views the photocathode through an 8 x 8 mil window
(4 x 10-4 cm2 ). Thus, a peak interference rate of 2000 el/sec is
predicted to impinge on the multiplier, compared with the expected
Ssignal of 400 el/sec from the photocathode for the dimmest star.
The peak electron production rate in the acquisition camera window
can be expected to be about the same as in the FES window. There-
fore, the FES and camera interference rates are considered possibly
severe, should be verified by tests, and special baffles may be
necessary.
The penetration of backscattered electrons from the mirror through
the FES window was evaluated with the Monte Carlo electron results
and found to be less than 103 electrons/cm 2 sec at the peak electron
environment, thus is insignificant compared to the Cerenkov inter-
ference.
5.3.3 KCI Target Interference in SEC Vidicon
The data on page 11-4 of the IUE SDR, Volume I, are used to develop
a failure criterion. If a constant flux of 200 electrons/cm2-sec
corresponding to a 5-year cumulative fluence of 3 x 1010 electrons/cm 2
is considered as the maximum acceptable interference rate for a one-
hour exposure, then referring to the electron peak penetration rate
74
D180-18486-1
5.3.3 (Continued)
chart for L = 5.2 and 200 electrons/cm2-sec, a total shield of approxi-
mately 2.0 g/cm 2 is required, Of course, it should be noted that
limiting the peak rate at L - 5.2 to 200 electrons/cm2-sec by 2.0 g/cm2
results in a 5-year accumulation of considerably less than 3 x 1010
electrons/cm 2, Referring to Section 5,1,2 above, approximately 2g/cm 2
is available. Thus the basic construction of the camera head module
appears to provide adequate shielding of the SEC target from penetrat-
ing electron flux interference for the L - 5,2 level, which is the
worst case. Bremsstrahlung interference is considered negligible.
5.3.4 SEC Preamplifier Noise
Since the SEC preamplifier noise is important to the ultimate sensitivity
for the detection of UV photons, the effect of ionizing radiation on
the noise of JFET's was considered. Krishnan and Chen, (Reference 61)
have concluded that generation - recombination noise is the component
of noise most sensitive to increase following electron bombardment.,
The effect is similar in both n-channel and p-channel devices and is
characterized by two time constants, one due to traps in the gate-channel
depletion region and the other due to traps in the channel, The
effect is most pronounced at low frequencies, but still very significant
above 1KHz. "At an electron fluence of 1 x 1015 e/cm 2 , the minimum
noise figure at 600 KHz was increased by a factor of four or five
for either type of transistor; the equivalent noise current measured
with a 2.2Kg source resistance at 100 KHz was increased by a factor
of about 40 for the p-channel transistor and by a factor of about 60
for the n-type channel transistor; but the changes in gm and IDSS are
less than 20 percent of the pre-irradiation value," The transistors
tested were Motorola 2N3824 and Texas Instrument 2N3909,
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The system performance is preamplifier noise limited for exposures
under about 3 hours, However, preamplifier shielding sufficient to
protect the electronics from the usual damage mechanisms (~1012el/cm 2)
seems adequate to prevent preamplifier noise increase,
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5.4 UV CONVERTER AND SEC VIDICON TEST PLAN
The vidicon tests needed are induced noise tests and permanent damage
(total dose) tests. The expected electron flux is sufficiently low
that it should be possible to complete the noise tests first without
subjecting the devices to a significant total dose. Accelerated total
dose exposures could then be made on the same devices. The possible
noise effects are fluorescence in various optical elements, secondary
electron emission, photo and compton electron emission and changes in
charge on the storage element (SEC target). The possible total dose
effects include reduced optical transmission of some of the optical
elements, changes in photo sensitivity of the photo cathodes, and
production of pin holes in the SEC target.
The easiest test, if no serious malfunction is encountered, would be to
irradiate the entire vidicon tube and UV converter uniformily with an
equivalent electron spectrum and observe any changes in readout. It
would be valuable, though, to know which element of the assembly
produces any changes observed to be caused by ionizing radiation so
that additional shielding of that element may be considered. It is,
therefore, proposed that several of the elements be exposed separately
as shown in Table 5-1.
5.4.1 Electron Flux Effects (Active Noise Test)
It is possible to accomplish the tests~ for the dose rate effects on
the complete assembly by using electrons of selected energies as shown
below.
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TABLE 5-1 SEC TEST PLAN OUTLINE
5.4.1 ELECTRON FLUX EFFECTS (ACTIVE NOISE TEST)
5.4.1.1 UV CONVERTER
5.4.1.1.1 MgF 2 WINDOW FLUORESCENCE. IRRADIATE WITH ELECTRONS.
Emax < 1.7 MeV, i.e., P-32, Sr-Y-90 OR ACCELERATOR
5.4.1.1.2 P1 1 FLUORESCENCE. IRRADIATE WITH Emax > 1.7 MeV Sr-Y-90
OR ACCELERATOR
5.4.1.2 SEC VIDICON
5.4.1.2.1 FIBER OPTIC WINDOW FLUORESCENCE. IRRADIATE WITH
Emax < 1.7 MeV P-32, Sr-Y-90 OR ACCELERATOR
5.4.1.2.2 INTERNAL TUBE NOISE. IRRADIATE SEC WITHOUT UV
CONVERTER THROUGH FIBER OPTIC WINDOW WITH Emax>1.7 MeV,
Sr-Y-90 OR ACCELERATOR. IRRADIATE THROUGH SIDE,
INCLUDING MAGNETIC SHIELD, WITH Emin > 3 MeV
5.4.1.3 ELECTRON SOURCES.
USE INCIDENT FLUX OF 108 ELECTRONS/cm 2 SEC IF BETAS ARE USED,
OR CORRECT OTHER SPECTRA TO GIVE AT LEAST 10X EXPECTED
PENETRATING FLUX
5.4.2 PERMANENT DAMAGE
5.4.2.1 IRRADIATE A MgF 2 WINDOW TO > 1014 ELECTRONS/cm
2
, ? 1.7 MeV.
MEASURE CHANGE IN UV TRANSMISSION EVERY /2 DECADE FROM
1010 ELECTRONS/cm 2
5.4.2.2 IRRADIATE A FIBER OPTIC WINDOW TO > 8.4 x 1012 ELECTRONS/cm 2 ,
> 1.7 MeV. MEASURE CHANGE IN OPTICAL TRANSMISSION
4000 TO 5000 A EACH % DECADE FROM 109 ELECTRONS/cm 2
5.4.2.3 IRRADIATE COMPLETE SEC VIDICON - UV CONVERTER ASSEMBLY,
INCLUDING MAGNETIC AND OTHER SHIELDING, TO ? 8.4 x 1012
ELECTRONS/cm 2 , > 3 MeV, OR > 1014 ELECTRONS/cm 2 EQUIVALENT
SPACE SPECTRUM. ROTATE WHILE IRRADIATING TO SIMULATE ISO-
TROPIC FLUENCE. MEASURE CHANGES IN PERFORMANCE AFTER
EXPOSURE AS PROOF OF ADEQUATE SHIELDING.
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5.4.1.1 UV Converter
5.4.1.1.1 MgF 2 Window Fluorescence
The first exposure should be made to determine the fluorescence of
the MgF2 window. The window would be exposed to electrons with a maxi-
mum range just short of the window thickness and at fluxes to at least
10 times the maximum expected, i.e., 108 electrons/cm 2 sec. Exposure
times should be comparable to the longer times to be used on the mis-
sion, e.g., 1 hour to 10 hours, unless appreciable noise background
increase is seen earlier.
Electron energies of the order of 0.7 to 1 Mev would be required,
depending on the final choice of MgF 2 thickness. 'The low flux, of 108
electronic cm-2 sec , makes the use of a radioisotope source feasible.
More will be said about electron sources later. If the SEC is read out
(scanned) after each exposure and the readings compared with the dark,
unirradiated, background readings, any increase should be caused by
fluorescence in the MgF 2 if the energy of the fluorescence photons is
sufficient to produce photo electrons in the CsTe photo cathode.
Many combinations of shields, columnated electron beams, low-level
spots of light., etc., are possible if they help determine the extent
of a change in the lower detection limit.
5.4.1.1.2 P11 Fluorescence
Having determined the MgF 2 fluorescence, a second group of exposures
should be made with electrons with a range greater than the MgF2 window
thickness. The thickness of material between the window and P11 is
almost insignificant (as also is the P11) so that an energy of the order
of 2 MeV would suffice for the second group of exposures. It would be
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5.4.1.1.2 (Continued)
difficult to avoid irradiating the fiber optic window under the thin
P11 phosphor, but, because the P11 is known to be a very efficient
phosphor, any fluorescence in the underlying materials would be of
minor significance. By proceeding as with the MgF 2 test and sub-
tracting any MgF 2 fluorescence using care to calculate an appropriate
internal fluence, the increase in lower detection limit caused by P11
fluorescence could be determined.
5.4.1.2 SEC Vidicon
5.4.1.2.1 Fiber Optic Window Fluorescence
It would probably be impractical to accurately determine the fluorescence
of the fiber optics by irradiating the assembly through the MgF 2 and
P11. The best method would be to irradiate an SEC without an attached
UV converter. The electron beam would be normal to the end of the SEC
and the energy selected so that the electron range would not exceed the
thickness of the window, i.e., <1.7 MeV. Phosphorous 32 would meet
this requirement. The SEC fiber optics are the same material as the
fiber optics on the UV converter; both are made by Galileo, Deter-
mining the fluorescence of one fiber optic will suffice for both.
5.4.1.2.2 Internal Tube Noise
There is some probability that additional noise will result from
electrons penetrating the vidicon tube, but this is difficult to
assess accurately without a test. Using the data from V1 of the IUE
system report, the preamplifier will contribute the equivalent of
156 photo electrons per pixel and the vidicon 1.4 x 10-2 photo
electrons/pixel sec. Therefore, the vidicon noise will equal the
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5.4.1.2.2 (Continued)
preamplifier noise at approximately 104 sec exposure, The preamplifier
noise will predominate for exposure times less than 104 sec and the
noise will significantly increase when equivalent of the order 156
photo electrons per pixel = approximately 1.4 x 107 photo electrons
per cm2 have been generated in the vidicon by high-energy electrons.
This is equal to 4 x 103 photo electrons/cm2 sec for one hour. The
energy of the electrons with ranges (at normal incidence) just equal to
the thickness of the vidicon tube walls plus the magnetic shield is
given in Table 5-2, from which it is observed that only electrons
.with energies exceeding 2.6 MeV penetrate the vidicon tube. The energy
spectrum of the penetrating electrons is much higher that that of the
accelerated photo electrons. The rate of energy loss per cm of
these high energy electrons in the target is at least 10 times less
than that of photo electrons from the photo cathode, accelerated
through the vidicon electrostatic field, and the thickness (10 - 20p)
of the 1 - 2 percent density KC1 target is less than the range of the
electrons from either source. Therefore, at least 10 times as many
high-energy electrons as photo electrons would be necessary to produce
an equivalent noise charge in the target, Secondary electron emissions
from the inner surface of the tube would only be a few percent of the
incident, high-energy electron flux, andBremsstrahlung production would
also be only a few percent. It is therefore, reasonable to predict
that a penetrating electronflux of at least 4 x 104 electrons/cm 2 sec
would be necessary to produce a significant increase in vidicon noise
by internal mechanisms. From this reasoning, it does not seem that a
separate test for orbital electron interference in the SEC is of prime
importance.
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TABLE 5-2 ELECTRON STOPPING POWER OF SEC VIDICON TUBE AND METAL SHIELD
MATERIAL/THICKNESS THICKNESS THICKNESS, INCL. STOPPING POWER
.g/cm2  U METAL g/cm 2  Mev 1
Fiberglas Window, 1/8" 0.8 - 1.7
Kovar, 1/32 " 0.6 1.46 2.9
Glass Wall, 1/16" 0.4 1.26 2.6
Ceramic, 1/8" 0.8 1.66 3.3
c MgF2 Window 0.1" 0.8 
1.7
MgF2 + 2 Fiberglas Windows 2.4 4.7
Calculated from R(g/cm 2) = .542E (Mev) -.133
I
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5.4.1.3 Electron Sources
The electron flux to which the SEC vidicon should be tested is 108
particles/cm 2 sec. It is inconvenient to generate such a low current
beam with an accelerator, but a radioisotope source of this strength
is very convenient to work with. Easily procured radioisotopes which
emit only beta radiation in the energy range of interest are given in
Table 5-3.
The proton dose to the fiber optics will be similar to the electron
dose, and the proton dose penetrating the magnetic shield and SEC-
Vidicon tube walls will be approximately 5 times the electron dose,
We are, therefore, recommending that the fiber optic window and the
inside of the SEC-Vidicon be tested to 50 times the 95 percent
proton dose to include any uncertainty in the relative effectiveness
of protons to electrons,, Alternately, the fiber optics and the complete
SEC-Vidicon, UV converter could be tested with proton radiation, using
either > 1.6 x 1011 protons/cm 2 with energies of 60 MeV, or an equiva-
lent 20 MeV penetrating spectrum.
The tests recommended consist of determining the change in optical
absorption of the MgF 2 window and the fiber optic windows in the
optical range of interest, and a proof of design test on the complete
assembly of SEC, UV converter, magnetic shield, and a simulated shadow
shield to reduce the radiation incident on the window end of the
assembly to that expected in the satellite. This test will also
serve as a test on the KC1 target, but with the reservation that
the target will be scanned of the order of 106 times and irradiated
with the flood lamp nearly equal number of times during the mission.
It is difficult to say whether this would enhance or heal the damage. It
is assumed-that an acclerated rate of exposure, necessitated by practical
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TABLE 5-3 ISOTOPE SOURCES
-2
ISOTOPE E MAX3 Mev HALFLIFE RANGE, gm cm
C -36 0.7 106 y 0.246
P-32 1.7 14d 0.788
Sr-Y 90 0.6, '2.3 28. y 1.11
00
I
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5.4.1.3 (Continued)
considerations, will produce at least as much change as the same dose
at a lower rate would. Some indication of the rate of annealing,
given some initial damage, could be obtained by remeasuring the response
of the windows and the assembly at various times after exposure.
It may be preferrable to irradiate a vidicon tube passively or in an
electrically simplified test fixture, and return it to NASA for elec-
trical testing. Care should be taken in the case of passive irradia-
tion and in the design of the test fixture to prevent the production
of unrealistic electrical stress on the target.
It would also be possible to perform optical tests on the windows at
a facility different from the irradiation facility, but that would
be less convenience because several cycles of irradiation and testing
are recommended.
Some data on the transmission of the fiber optic window after exposure
of 5 x 105 rad to 106 rad was transmitted to us from Galileo Electro-
optics Corporation, from which Table 5-4 was constructed. The type
of radiation source was not given, however.
Radioisotope source strengths needed are in the 10 millicurie range,
and are easy to procure in the form of very thin deposits covered with
a thin window to prevent contamination and backed by sufficient low Z
material to absorb all the betas and facilitate handling. The beta
energy spectrum has some similarity to the trapped electron spectrum,
so would produce a similar depth dose.
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TABLE 5-4 PERCENT TRANSMISSION, FIBER OPTIC WINDOW
0 0. 0 0 0 0 0
DOSE 4000A 4250A 4500A 4750A 5000A 5250A 5500A
5 x 105 R 0.93 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.97
1 x 106 R 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.97
00
co
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5.4.1.3 (Continued)
The 0.1 inch MgF 2 window will stop all electrons <1.72 MeV, therefore,
a P-32 source with a small additional absorber would be a good choice
to irradiate the window and Sr-Y-90 betas would penetrate the window
and irradiate the P11 phosphor. (Ytrium -90 alone would be adequate
except for inconveniently short half life of 64 h). Alternately,
Sr-Y-90 could be used for both tests by first using an abosrber to
reduce the electron range to just less than the MgF 2 window thickness
and then removing the absorber to irradiate the P11 phosphor,
Chlorine -36 was included in the list of radioisotopes because,
although the beta range is less than half the thickness of MgF2, the
long half life would make it a more convenient source than P-32 for
testing the window fluorescence. Also, the Sr-90 betas from a Sr-Y-90
source have a spectrum similar to C1 -36 and a CI-36 source could be
used to obtain a correction factor for the Sr-90 contribution to the
window fluorescence in the test for P-11 fluorescence.
The selection of suggested radioisotopes was limited to isotopes which
do not emit gamma radiation, However, the gamma interaction probably
is only a few percent that for betas, and the selection of isotopes
could be extended if those which emit both betas and gamma were con-
sidered.
5.4.2 Permanent Damage (Total Dose)
Electron radiation was specified for the active noise tests because
trapped proton energies are too low to penetrate the satellite skin
and it is assumed that scientific data will not be taken during large
solar flares. The flare protons will contribute to the total dose,
87
D180-18486-1
5.4.2 (Continued)
however, and when considering whether or not a total dose test should
be made with protons, electrons or both it was necessary to consider
relative rad dose of each kind of particle and the relative damage
per rad caused by each kind of particle.
5.4.2.1 MgF2 Window
The belt electron dose will exceed the 95 percent proton dose for
areas shielded with less than approximately 1,2 gm/cm 2 and the proton
dose will exceed the electron dose for shielding greater than 1,2
g/cm 2. If it is assumed that approximately 0.5 g/cm 2 shielding will
be added to protect the MgF 2 from a total mission dose of greater
13 2 2than 10 electrons/cm , the electron dose to the MgF 2 will be
approximately 5 times the proton dose. An electron test to 1014
electrons/cm 2 should cover the uncertainties reasonably well.
5.4.2.2. Fiber Optic Windows
The electron range in the fiber optic on the SEC Vidicon is also 1.7
MeV and the same sources can be used to test the fiber optic for
fluorescence and to irradiate the inside of the tube through the
fiber optic window.
5.4.2.3 SEC-Vidicon - UV Converter Assembly
The minimum energy electron which will penetrate the vidicon plus
the magnetic shield was tabulated above. There is not an available
radio-isotope with sufficient beta energy to test the adequacy of the
self-shielding of the tube and magnetic shield. Therefore, an
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5.4.2.3 (Continued)
accelerator source is required if this test is to be made. The
current of a dc accelerator such as a Van de Graf or dynamitron
can be reduced to low levels by various combinations of running
at low filament current, using a filament with low thermionic
emission, spreading the beam with lenses, such as magnetic quad-
rapoles, and scattering the beam with a thin foil. If scattering
is used, it will be necessary to place the vidicon some distance
from the scatterer to obtain the desired reduction in flux, In
addition it will be necessary to account for the change in energy
spectrum caused by both the scattering foil and the intervening air.
A linear accelerator is a possible alternate to a-dc accelerator.
The required low average electronic flux can be obtained by a combina-
tion of short pulse width and low pulse repetition rate, probably in
conjunction with magnetic lenses and scattering, The minimum energy
of many linacs is approximately 5 MeV and the maximum energy is
typically 25 to 50 MeV, This opens several options of using a higher
energy electron beam plus scattering to obtain an electron spectrum
more representative of belt electrons than could be obtained from a
dc accelerator with a maximum energy of a few MeV.
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6.0 PREVIOUS SATELLITE EXPERIENCE
6.1 SPACECRAFT CHARGING EFFECTS
Reference 62 discussed anomalous behaviour in subsystems of several
different spacecraft in synchronous orbit, particularly ATS-5.
Flight data and laboratory simulations indicate that portions of the
spacecraft surface charge to many kilovolts under space electron bom-
bardmen, and discharge by arcs or corona. The consequent electro-
magnetic pulse can couple into cables and cause interference in
subsystems. Also degradation of the thermal blanket can occur from
removal of the metalization by the arc discharge.
A number of recommendations are made for spacecraft design practices
in the reference.
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6.2 S3 MOSDAM EXPERIMENT
Several MOS device types, the GI M2009, AMI SC1304, and the RCA CD4007A
were flown on the S3 satellite (Reference 63) as an experiment designed
to measure MOS degradation as a result of space radiation. The data
were obtained to permit evaluation of the extent of rate effects, if
any.
The dose-depth profiles for the S3 electron and proton environments
are shovn in Figures 6-1 and 6-2.. The internal environment level
from the dose-depth profiles for spherical shielding for the semicon-
ductor chips is shown in Table 6-1, using spacecraft configuration
data provided by Wannemacher. MOS test data from several sources
have been compiled in Table 6-2 to indicate the magnitude and vari-
ability of MOS response. The RCA CMOS data, except for the 4041A,
are for the early, less.vulnerable devices, to be comparable to the
devices used in MOSDAM. The particular CMOS laboratory data used to
compare with the MOSDAM data seem representative. The pseudo control
group laboratory data are shown in Table 6-3. The MOSDAM data for
which comparable laboratory data was avilable are shown in Table 6-4.
Table 6-5 compares the MOSDAM data with the laboratory data. Values
of dose ratio greater than one would indicate long-term annealing.
Values of voltage ratios less than one would indicate long-term
annealing. Thus, some long-term annealing may have occurred. However,
the ratios observed are of the magnitude of environment prediction
errors, moreover, the magnitudes of the ratios do not appear suffi-
ciently large or consistent to provide anything but an additional,
possibly undependable, safety factor.
Several contacts were made in the industry concerning long-term
annealing. These contacts were M. Simon (RTI), B. D. Shafer (Sandia),
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TABLE 6-1 INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT MOSDAM EXPERIMENT
INDIVIDUAL COMPOSITE DOSE PER THICKNESS
SIDE ITEM TOTAL
.g/cm 2  /4r g/cm 2  2/4r PROTON ELECTRO TOTAL ITEM
OUTSIDE HOUSING, COMPONENT .206 .4 .892 .4 2 x 104 3 x 104 5 x 104 2.0 x 104
HOUSING, SPACECRAFT .206 .4
CIRCUIT BOARD .274 .4
PIECE PART PACKAGE .206 1
BOTTOM HOUSING, COMPONENT .206 .2 .686 .2 3 x 104 105 1.3 x 105 .2.6 x 104
CIRCUIT BOARD .274 .2
PIECE PART PACKAGE .206 1
TOP SPACECRAFT co .4 - -
00
03
4.6 x 104 RAD (Si)/DAYR .
= 126 RAD (Si)/DAY c
-J
TABLE 6-2 COMPARISON OF MOS LABORATORY DATA
VT
N-CHANNEL P-CHANNELWITH MOSDAM6
10 RAD. 10 RAD 10 RAD 10. RAD
SOURCE DEVICE BIAS BIAS BIAS BIAS
(See Notes) 0 V 10 0 V 10 V 0 - V 0 10 V
REF, 64 4001A ? 0.45 1,6 +0,85 TOO ( 0,55 0,2 2.6 0,75
LARGE
REF.64 4007 0,5 2,9 1.0 4.7 0.85 8.2 1.8 5.7
REF. 65* ' 4007. 0,5 1.6 +0.6 TOO 0,3 -O 1,2 1.0
LARGE
REF, 66* 4007 0.6 2.7 +0.6 TOO 0,4 -0.2 2.5 0.9
LARGE
REF. 67 4007A +0.4: 1,9 +2,0 2,0 1.4 0.5 4,6 2.5
REF. 67 4007 0.3 1.5 0.2 1.6 0.2 6.3 0.75 7.0
REF, 68 4007 --- --- --- 0.4 5,6 --- -
REF. 69 4041A -2.0 --8.2 --- --- ~2.0 -3,0 ---
REF. 70 AMI PMOS TEST ... ... ... ... - AT 5.6...
DEVICE x 104
-- RAD '
1 3,7 V
NOTES ON COMPARISON OF MOS DATA
1 The data. from Ref. 64 through 68 compare the variations in Laboratory test data for the
type of devices used in the MOSDAM experiment. The intent is to determine a pseudo
control group for the MOSDAM experiment.
- 2 The data from Reference 69 shows the increased degradation of the "New A" series. 0
-3 Reference 70 provides additional PMOS test data.
*PROBABLY "A" SERIES 00
*COMPARED WITH MOSDAM
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TABLE 6-3 LABORATORY DATA - PSEUDO CONTROL GROUP FOR MOSDAM
DEVICE CHANNEL BIAS DOSE FOR AVT FOR
VOLTS AVT = 1/2V 105 RAD
P 0 8 x 104 0.55V
CD4001A
(REFERENCE 64)
N 0 1 x 105  0.45V
P 0 1.4 x 104 1.3
AM11304
(REFERENCE 64)
P -10 1.8 x 104 1.1
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TABLE 6-4 MOSDAM DATA
TIME FOR DOSE AVT FOR
DEVICE CHANNEL BIAS AVT = 1/2 V RAD
VOLTS DAYS FOR AVT = T/2 V 105 RAD
P 0 330 4.16 x 104 0.6
CD4007A
(Ref 64)"' N 0 650 8.19 x 104 .0.21
P 0 270 3.4x 104 0.8
AMI1304
(Ref 64) P -12 230. 2.9 x 104  1,0
0
00
I
TABLE 6-5 MOSDAM COMPARISON WITH LAB DATA .1
DOSE RATIO, VOLTAGE RATIO,
BIAS MOSDAM DOSE) VT MOSDAM
DEVICE CHANNEL VOLTS \LAB DOSE TLA---
FOR VT 1/2 FOR105 RAD(Si)
P 0 0.52 -1CD 4001A
(REFERENCE 64)
0 0 N 0 0.82 0.47
AMI 1304 P 0 2.43 0.62
(REFERENCE 64)
P -10 1.6 ~1
NOTES ON MOSDAM COMPARISON WITH LAB DATA
Q The ambient temperatures during irradiations in the MOSDAM and the lab experiments
were found to be nearly equal.0 Danchenko's data on CD4001A are compared to MOSDAM CD4007A data since both types of
devices were made not far apart in 1971. There are no lab data available on CD4007A
devices for the same period. However, the radiation hardness of CD4001A and CD4007A
devices is presumably the same, due to identical oxide processing techniques.( The time delay between radiations and measurements is not indicated in Danchenko's
report. If the short term (0-few hrs.) annealing was not negligible, the amount of 1
damage was underestimated.
co
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6.2 (Continued)
H. Sanders (Sandia), L. Palkuti (NRL), and R. Burghard (Sandia). The
general consensus was that long-term annealing did occur, however,
opinion on its extent ranged from small to very significant. The
relevant data base was small, however.
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6.3 COMSAT RADIATION PROTECTION
Space radiation protection has been incorporated into the COMSAT
satellites. Discussions were held with COMSAT and Hughes personnel.
A summary of the techniques used is given below.
o Radiation hardening is started at the design stage.
o Radiation test data on every piece part flown is obtained by
using existing data or performing additional tests.
o In general, piece part radiation screening is done by sample
testing on device lots.
o 100% radiation screening of piece parts by applying 5-10% of
expected radiation level without annealing is done when budget
permits.
o Irradiate and anneal is not favored because of expense and con-
cern over reliability impact.
o Detailed dose distribution calculations within spacecraft boxes
are performed.
o Use of MOS is minimized,,and where used, MOS is spot shielded.
Recent RCA MOS are shielded to 103 rad (Si).
o Weight problem is solved with powerful boosters.
o For the one satellite failure observed, which occurred after
four years, no screening was done, but MOSFETS were shielded.
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7.0 DETAILED SHIELDING CALCULATIONS
7.1 SHIELDING MATERIAL SELECTION
It is desired to select (choose among alternate z values) a shield
material that provides a specified internal environment with minimum
weight. Competing physical processes (electron dose and brems-
strahlung dose) result in a complex relationship between the optimum
material and the desired internal total dose.
The electron dose alone is most effectively shielded by materials of
high z, as they produce increased scatter in the material, For
electron-dose reduction alone, high z material is then best. However,
increasing z leads to increased bremsstrahlung production. This
results in the. electron plus bremsstrahlung depth-dose curves
decreasing in slope at greater thicknesses. Depth-dose curves for
z = 13, 22, 52, and 92 are shown in Figure 7-1. The dose curves
actually cross over at various thicknesses, with, for example,
uranium (z=92) crossing the aluminum curve at 1.15 g/cm 2 , or 5.8
x 103 rad/year. The solar proton-attenuation curve is only weakly
effected by changes in material. The optimum material will then
depend on the internal dose level required, and the weight savings
possible will also depend on the internal dose level and resultant
optimum z material.
3
Choosing a required internal dose level, for example 1.7 X 10 rad/
year, determining the required thickness for each z from Figure 7-1,
and then plotting z versus thickness, then repeating for several
required internal levels, results in the curves of Figure 7-2. The
value of z for minimum weight then can be seen for a particular
internal-environment requirement.
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7.1 (Continued)
For low dose levels (1.7 X 103 R/Yr) aluminum is optimum, while for
higher levels increasing z materials are optimum. The percent weight
saving possible for different criteria levels with aluminum are shown
at the left side of Figure 7-2, while the percent weight savings over
aluminum obtainable by choosing the optimum material are shown on the
right side of Figure 7-2. These results are given for the electron
and bremsstrahlung dose only.
Choosing the optimum z for each internal dose level from Figure 7-2,
and plotting optimum z versus dose, the optimum z shield without solar
proton dose curve in Figure 7-3. The result of adding solar proton
95 percent dose is shown. Figure 7-3 also shows the material thick-
nesses required for an aluminum shield to reduce both the electron
plus bremsstrahlung dose to a given level, and also to reduce the total
radiation environment; electron dose, bremsstrahlung dose, and solar
proton dose, to a given level. Note that for higher criteria dose
levels (> 104 rad/year) high z materials offer weight savings above
20 percent, but as the criteria dose is lowered the optimum material
z and the possible weight saving are both reduced.
It is important to note that the detailed shield weight calculations
are keyed to criteria of 5 X 103, 104, and 5 X 104 rad (Si) of trans-
mitted electron dose plus nominal proton dose. Bremsstrahlung dose
and the 95% solar proton dose are not included. Referring to Figure
7-3, which includes bremsstrahlung, a level of 1.7 X 103 rad (Si)/yr
(5 X 103 rad (Si) mission) corresponds to 1.5 gm/cm 2 , then adding the
95% solar proton criteria dose, 3.3 X 103 rad (Si)/yr or 104 rad (Si)/
p mission results. MOS failures and some bipolar transistor failures
are expected in the neighborhood of 104 rad (Si).
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- WITH SOLAR PROTON 95% DOSE
..-- - WITHOUT SOLAR PROTON DOSE
ELECTRONS PLUS BREMSSTRAHLUNG
ECCENTRIC SYNCHRONOUS ORBIT
104  N
Z= 92
, ALUMINUM SHIELD
OPTIMUM Z
< SHIELD
I Z=22 %
103
o
- \\
103
0 1.0 2.0 3.0
MATERIAL THICKNESS - GM/CM 2
FIGURE 7-3 SHIELDING REQUIREMENTS FOR VARIOUS MATERIALS
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7.1 (Continued)
The basic safety factors are: 1) the 95 percent solar proton criteria
is about three times a predicted mean value, 2) the possibility of
long-term annealing of the semiconductor damage, and 3) slight con-
servatism in the shielding calculations as a result of using the
spherical shielding values.
These safety factors are balanced by the significant possibilities
of the existence of unusually radiation sensitive components or small
circuit design margins in critical applications which are undetected
because of the limited scope of this study, as well as uncertainties
in predicted belt environment levels. Thus the shielding thicknesses
corresponding to 5 X 103 rad (Si) electron dose are recommended for
all system components except those for which specific data permits
setting higher levels (e.g., mechanism electronics, computer central
processor module (CPM), etc.). For this criteria aluminum is the best
shield. However, if decreased weight and consequent greater risk is
necessary, the data in Figures 7-1 through 7-3 permit choice of optimum
shield material for any desired internal environment criterion.
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7.2 SHIELDING CALCULATION METHOD
7.2.1 Solid Angle Calculation Method
Determination of shielding for the IUE was calculated considering both
the material immediately surrounding sensitive piece parts and adjacent,
nontouching masses which provide some additional protection (shadow
shielding). To determine the effect of any object providing shadow
shielding, its effective thickness and the solid angle obscured by the
object as viewed from some desired dose point must be known. The
method used for calculating solid angles is developed below for a
rectangular obscuring surface.
As.shown below, the dimensions of the obscuring surface are 1 and m.
The dose point P is a perpendicular distance C from one corner x
of the surface. The vector r is the directed distance to an element
of surface area ds.
P z
I xt
OBSCURING
107SURFACE
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7.2.1 (Continued)
A general expression for solid angle Q is
r
Then, developing the expression for Q for the rectangular surface
viewed from P,
r = xi + yj + ck
ds = k dxdy
r= (x +y 2 + c2
y x = m dx dy
n = c (x 2  + c2 3/2
y= o x=o
This expression was integrated to closed form:
m dx
S= cf (x 2 + c2 )(x2 + c2  2)
= tan1 m 1
c(m2 + X2 + 2)-
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7.2.1 (Continued)
The above formulation gives the solid angle obscured by a rectangular
slab at a point a perpendicular distance c away from one corner of
the slab. Similar approaches were used to calculate the solid angles
of off axis discs, etc.
In some cases, it is desired to calculate the solid angle obscured by
a rectangular slab for a dose point at any arbitrary position with
respect to the rectangular surface.
The approach is to add (or subtract) additional rectangles until the
dose point is on a line perpendicular to the corner of a new rectangle
in such a manner that the solid angle of the composite rectangle and
the additional rectangles can be calculated by the above formulation,
then separating the desired solid angle. For example:
S3 2 POINT P IS A DISTANCE
c ABOVE PLANE OF
RECTANGLE RECTANGLES.
1
4 (OBSCURING
SURFACE)
THEN i s" 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 =.5l + 3 + 4 +  2 + 3 3
THUS %i + 3 -2 + 3 - 3 + 4
So that 0 is broken into elements, all of which can be calculated
by the previous formulation, and then Q1 can be expressed in terms
of known solid angles.
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7.2.1 (Continued)
To illustrate this method and to indicate the capability of obscuring
objects to provide shielding, an example solid angle shielding calcula-
tion is performed below.
BACK
SHIELDING
OBSCURING SURFACE
ASSUME: 1) ELECTRON FLUX IS ISOTROPIC
2) ELECTRON FLUX INCIDENT OVER 2w
(INFINITE BACK SHIELDING).
p , 3) OBSCURING SURFACE IS SQUARE
OBSCURING SURFACE
*----- LL2d --
dp I SOLID ANGLE BLOCKED BY THE
P d 2d OBSCURING SURFACE IS CALCULATED
04 L=2d FOR THREE LOCATIONS OF THE
OBSCURING SURFACE WITH RESPECT
TO THE DOSE POINT
P
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7.2.1 (Continued)
For dose point P at 1
t= d
m= d
so that
= 4 tan 1  2 d 2
c(2d2 + c2
The solid angle blocked by the obscuring surface was calculated for
several separation distances c, which are expressed as fractions of
the length of the side of the obscuring surface as c = 0.05L, 0.lL,
0.5L, and L.
For c = 0.05L = O.ld
r = 4 tan - I  1 = 5.72
0.1(2.01)2
then 2 0.912r
which shows that 91 percent of the half-space is blocked by the
obscuring surface at point 1 for c = 0.05L. Since it has been
assumed for these examples that the rear half space is completely
blocked, then only .09 percent of the sphere is unobscured.
111
D180-18486-1
7.2.1 (Continued)
For dose point 2
* = 2d, m= d
tan 1  2d2
c(5d2 + c2 )
then for c = .05L = .Id
2
= 2 tan- 1  ) = 2.7
.1(5.01)
.432=
For dose point 3
tan-1  L
c(2L + c )
then for c = .05L
i = tan = 1.5
.05(2.0025)2
-= .242v
The above calculations are repeated for the other values of c, and the
results are given in Table 7-1.
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TABLE 7-1 SHADOW SHIELDING EXAMPLE
211
LG. 0.05L 0.1 L 0.5L L
0.91 0.82 0.33 0.13
0.43 0.43 0.22 0.10
0.24 0.23 0.15 0.08
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7.2.1 (Continued)
The ratios Q/2Tr or in some cases Q/4Tr are the shielding factors for
obscuring surfaces. Such factors are used in the detailed shielding
calculations.
The fraction of unobscured solid angle for the above examples can
be calculated by:
Open Fraction = 1 -
The open fractions determined from the shielding factors in Table 7-1
have been plotted in Figure 7-4. Figure 7-4 illustrates that a
dose point must be quite close to the obscuring surface to provide
significant shielding.
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1.0 -
c L
0.8- -- --
c .5L0.6 - .5L
I/t
OPEN \
FRACTION \
\ c DISTANCE FROM
0.4. DOSE POINT TO
0.- \ / OBSCURING SURFACE
\ c O1L /
\ ,L - SIDE LENGTH OF
OBSCURING SURFACE
0.2-
c .05L
0\ OBSCURING SURFACE
Point Point () Point Point
I< L=2d
FIGURE 7-4 SHADOW SHIELDING EXAMPLE
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7.2.2 Shield Thickness Calculations
The method used to perform the shielding calculations for this study
considers both the shielding provided by the surrounding material
(piece-part package, housing, and platform) and the shadowing provided
by nearby objects. Simplifying assumptions were made to provide
tractability.
The spherical values for the electron dose-depth curve were used,
since the component sides were not wide enough for the slab values to
be pertinent, and since the spherical values were better near component
corners. For a dose point just inside each component side, calcula-
tions were made for the one-half space (2 II steradians) just outside
that side. This calculation assumed that one-half the dose reaches
the dose point through the considered side, and that one-half the dose
reaches the dose point from all of the other sides. This assumption
is valid for a uniformly shielded box. The overall procedure, in-
cluding shadow shielding, results in a uniformly shielded box. An
additional refinement is made in that one octant behind the dose point
is assumed to be completely blocked. In the shadow-shielding calcula-
tions, the solid angle Q, subtended by each significant shadowing
object was calculated for each component side. These solid angles
determined the shielding factors --.
The material thicknesses on each side of the sensitive piece parts
separating them from the external environment were identified, tabu-
lated, and summed. To distinguish the sides of each component,.a
directional system similar to cylindrical coordinates was defined.
Each component side was designated by the direction it faces. In this
system sides of components that primarily face the longitudinal axis
of the spacecraft are termed "inside", sides facing away, "outside",
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7.2.2 (Continued)
sides facing the telescope direction of the axis are termed "top",
sides facing the apogee motor direction "bottom", and "left" and
"right" sides face directions of left and right rotation about the
axis.
To illustrate the overall method, consider the internal environment
calculation for the inside of the VHF Transponder (#1). Referring
to Table 7-2, the item column lists the significant shields. The
housing is given as 31 mils Al (0.212 gm/cm2); the piece-part package
-is assumed to be equivalent to 30 mils Al, and values are given for
the main platform, upper platform, spectrograph cover, and echelle
deck.
Individual shielding factors are given for each item. With the excep-
tion of the housing and piece-part package, these factors are indepen-
dent (nonoverlapping). The composite column gives the total shielding
occupied by each fraction of solid angle. For example, the main plat-
form provides 0.343 g/cm 2 over 43 percent of the half space, to which
is added 0.212 g/cm 2 for the housing and 0.206 g/cm 2 for the piece-
part package, for a total of 0.761 g/cm 2 over 43 percent of the half
space. The same procedure is used for the upper platform, the spectro-
graph cover, and the echelle deck. All the shadow shielders occupy
72 percent of half space, leaving 28 percent for the combination of
housing and piece-part package of 0.418 g/cm . The dose through
0.418 g/cm2 is 5.6 X 105 rad (Si), Figure 7-5, for a three-year mission,
using one half the spherical shielding value (for half space). Then
multiplying by 0.28, the dose contributed by that fraction of the half
space is 1.57 X 105 rad (Si). Similar calculations are performed for
the remaining items. The sum of 2.17 X 105 rad (Si) is the dose.
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TABLE 7-2 INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT VHF TRANSPONDER NO. 1
INDIVIDUAL COMPOSITE DOSE PER DOSE PER
COMPONENT/SIDE ITEM 2 2 TsuICKNESS ITEM )
g/cm g/cm 2 T HCNS IT
HOUSING .2/2 /.0 . /8 ? 6 /oS  P sY -5c
OUTSIDE PIECE-PART PACKAGE .206 /0 - - '
S-BAND TRANSMITTER oo oo P 0 0 _
HOUSING .2/2 /.0 .4/8 .z ..6x/o /,f 7//o
PIECE-PART PACKAGE .206 /.o0 -
INSIDE MAIN PLATFORM .343 .43 .7/ .93 6. >
UPPER PLATFORM .2/ .01 .637 , Oq 5xO- /
SPECTRO COVER 20 . ~ , .,
ECHELLE DECK 0o ,09 . . .09 0 0 2./7'/O
HOUSING .22z / ' ,4 / /,0 , /o 56 x/o5"
RIGHT PIECE-PART PACKAGE .2o6, /, -- 1-- -
HOUSING .2/2- /,0 ,i0/' ./, 7 56 X/ , 6 p X/
LEFT. PIECE-PART PACKAGE ,zo AO -1 - -. 6 X / "
HOUSING. .2/ / .4s/ .~'6 ~-6X/o 6  FS, X o/ r
TOP. PIECE-PART PACKAGE .Zo C. / -
UPPER PLATFORM .Z/ ,/- 637 /- /5X / 2,0g
) /y °4" 5' ,.0 X/o
. HOUSING .2/2 10, .7/ /,2 ), g X/o 6. 8 '/o co
BOTTOM PIECE-PART PACKAGE . 206 / - - co
MAIN PLATFORM .3--3 /. - - 6 /
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7.2.2 (Continued)
at the dose point through one side only. The allowable dose for that
side, 2.86 X 103 rad (Si), is one half the required internal environ-
ment, 5 X 105 rad (Si), increased by a small factor to account for
the blocki'ng rear octant previously discussed. Then, to obtain the
additional shielding required, refer to the dose-depth curve for one-
half the spherical values for a three-year mission, obtain an equiva-
lent thickness of 0.57 g/cm2 for 2.17 X 105 rad (Si), and a required
thickness of 1.35 g/cm 2 for 2.86 X 103 rad (Si). Thus the additional
shielding required for the inside is 0.78 g/cm 2 for an internal
environment of 5 X 103 rad (Si). This value is converted to weight
in the additional shielding column of Table 7-3. It is important to
note that the required 0.78 g/cm2 can be obtained in several ways
(such as piece-part placements, consideration of existing flanges
in an equipment stack,-spot shielding, etc., other than simply adding
a 115 mil aluminum plate. Consequently the given shield weight as
herein calculated may be reducible in specific cases, while maintain-
ing the required total shielding.
The procedure of obtaining an equivalent shield thickness of 0.57g/cm 2
for the sum dose of 2.17 X 105 rad (Si) is permissible because the
depth-dose profile is approximately linear,.in the thickness region
of interest, on semilog paper. Thus an additional shield slab on a
component side will reduce the contribution at the dose from each
shadow shield by the same proportion.
Reductions in shield weight as a result of connector cut-outs have
been incorporated into the weight calculations.
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TABLE 7-3 ADDITIONAL SHIELvING VHF TRANSPONDER NO. 1
EXISTING ADDITIONAL SHIELDING, ALUMINUM .
COMPONENT/SIDE HOUSING 5x10 3 RAD(Si) 104 RAD(Si)
THICKNESS 2WEIGHT()
MILS A m/cm2  MILS Al AREA (in WEIGHT(lb) gm/cm MILS Al AREA(in 
WEIGHT(lb)
OUTSIDE £1 .928 /35 22 .289 .803 //5 2- ,
INSIDE 31 .779 //5 Z .,2 .6Sq 95 2 2 .203
RIGHT 31 .928 /35 .- 0 ,526. g0o3 //5 40 . 48
LEFT 31 .928 /35 24 .3/5 .803 1/5 24 .29
TOP 31 DOD /30 40 7,5 .705 //5 4-8 .48
BOTTOM 31 .587 85, #-0 .33 . /. 65 8 -15
TOTAL 2, 1 1 /.,7
NO SOLID ANGLE S///EL //V6G FRoM
S BAND TRA/SSM/ITERS /5 ASSU/VTED
0
a-o
TABLE 7-3 .ADDITIONAL SHIELDING VHF TRANSPONDER NO. 1 (CONTINUED)
EXISTING ADDITIONAL SHIELDING, ALUMINUM
COMPONENT/SIDE HOUSING 5x10 'RAD(Si)
THICKNESS WEIGHT(lb) 2 2) WEIGHT(lb)
MILS LAREAin WEIGHT( b)  gm/cm MILS Al AREA MILS Al AA(in
 EIGHT(b)
OUTSIDE 3/ , 70 2- ,/O
INSIDE Y/ ,35 .2 , l107
RIGHT 3/ . f 70 L0 . ,273
LEFT 31 (9. 70 4 1
TOP q / ,98 70 0 , _73
BOTTOM 3/ ./5 20 L0 ,9 7
TOTAL I, r*o -
" NO -SOL1t A GAIGLE sHIELOINCG
FROM S-BANO TAN5rNI7TTER o
Is A SS Ui D
co
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7.2.2 (Continued)
The remaining sides of the VHF Transponder were done similarly.
Additional calculations were done for 104 rad (Si) and 5 X 104 rad
(Si) of electron dose.
7.3 WEIGHT SUMMARY
Using the techniques of Section 7.2, the shield thicknesses for the
remaining components and component stacks were calculated. The
results are given in the Supplement to this report. The consequent
shield weights are summarized in Table 7-4. These are values for
aluminum. Section 7.1 provides data for conversion to other materials,
if needed.
7.4 STREAMING
The extent of streaming of belt electrons through a small crack in
the side of a box can be calculated using the solid-angle formula.
Defining the length of the crack as 2, the width of the crack as m,
and the distance from the crack to the dose point as c, the solid
angle of the crack is:
= 2 tan 1  m
c(m2+2+c2)
Assuming that the piece-part packages provide 0.21 g/cm 2 shielding,
a transistor chip otherwise unshielded would receive 5 X 106 rad (Si)
in three years. Then assuming that the piece-part is completely
shielded by the housing except for the crack, the streaming dose
Ds is found by:
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TABLE 7-4 WEIGHT SUMMARY
SUMMARY OF ADDITIONAL WEIGHT
SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT 5xl0 3 RAD(Si 104 RAD(Si) 5xi04RAD(Si)
COMPONENT STACK COMPONENT STACK COMPONENT STACK
WEIGHT WEIGHT WEIGHT WEIGHT WEIGHT WEIGHT
COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM'.
S BAND TRANSMITTER #1 (a
S BAND TRANSMITTER.#2 (a
VHF TRANSPONDER #1.(a) 2 2 /. 87 , 05
VHF TRANSPONDER #2 (a) z, 2 /,, 0
COMMAND SUBSYSTEM:
COMMAND RELAY ../0 / 7
COrMMAND DECODER #1 /,27 /,//
COMMAND DECODER #2 /f 7 /7/
5.3
DATA HANDLING SUBSYSTEM:
MULTIPLEXER:
CONVERTER (PRIME) a.8o
CONVERTER (BACKUP) . 3 7 , 3/
DATAPLEXER(PRIME) 0 ,95 0,93
DATAPLEXER(BACKUP) 0 . 5 .1 64
SUBPLEXER #1' O,/ 014
SUBPLEXER #2 04o / -5
.E SUDPLEXER #3 0t?5 0 -75T
SUBPLEXER #4 0 . 5.57
CO
!I
TABLE 7-4 WEIGHT SUMMARY (CONTINUED)
SUMMARY OF ADDITIONAL WEIGHT
SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT 5x1 03 RAD(Si) 104 RAD(Si). 5x10 4 RAD(Si)
COMPONENT STACK COMPONENT STACK COMPONENT STACK
WEIGHT WEIGHT WEIGHT WEIGHT WEIGHT WEIGHT
COMPUTER:
POWER CONVERTER #1 (a o,99 0. 0 .3
POWER CONVERTER #2 (a 0.53 0.46 oz
CPM #1 (c), 0"5 0-5 p, 30
CPM #2 . (c) ,~' 0. 7.
3-6 3,0 /.9
MEMORY: (a,
MEMORY #1 (a ./ '- 5 I/ Z /  .0.-
-MEMORY #2 (a /,o 6, o.o 0 50
MEMORY.. #3 (a /, g /,G ,83
•,, 3.Z 2,03
POWER SUBSYSTEM:
POWER MODULES (2TOT) (a 3. 2.. 68 7
MISSION ADAPTOR .3.57 3 5 7
STABILIZATION & CONTROLS
SUBSYSTEM:
IRA SENSOR CAP
IRA ELECTRONICS (b 7.Z - ,. 5
NUTATION SENSOR ASSY: " /g
CONTROL ELECTRONICS ASSY 350
WHEEL DRIVE ASSY /.-. /// I
-J
I.-, .C
I;
TABLE 7-4 WEIGHT SUMMARY (CONTINUED)
SUMMARY OF ADDITIONAL WEIGHT
SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT 5x103 RAD(Si) 104 RAD(Si) 5x10 4 RAD(Si)
COMPONENT STACK COMPONENT I STACK COMPONENT STACK
!WEIGHT WEIGHT WEIGHT WEIGHT WEIGHT WEIGHT
SUN SENSORS AND PAS W/I
SUN SENSOR & PAS
ELECTRONICS .77 Z.-0
SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENT
SUBSYSTE'M:
EXP. MECH MOUNTED
.ELECTRONICS:
.24'
M3DE SELECT MECH EL (a)
SHUTTER MECH EL (a) .22 ./
FOCUS MECH EL.
EXPERIMENT ELECTRONICS
ASSY/
CAIMERA ELECTRONICS BOX zi-3 3./4
ACQUISITION CHM (2 TOTAL) /,s5- / 5/
SPECTROGRAPH CHM (4 TOTAL 3. 4 ./Z
FES .HM (a,b) .. o .
FES ELECTRONICS (b) /,27 /,0 o
SUN SHUTTER SENSOR
NOTES:
(a) ALL IIPOLAR
(b) ASSUM ES ZERO EX STING HOUING THICKN SS.
(c) TTL (NLY
D180-18486-1
7.4 (Continued)
S06
Ds  - X 5 X 10 rad (Si)
The results are plotted in Figure 7-6.
This procedure overestimates the streaming dose, since the collimating
effect of the crack is not considered. Also, the effect of the crack
length is negligible nearby. However, it is evident that crack
widths of 0.002 inches or less are desirable to keep the streaming
dose to a fraction of the allowable internal environment.
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8X10 3
7X10 3  C=0.5"
6X10 3
5X10 3
*-
4X10 3
C=1"
Ls
C) 3
o 3X10
2X10 3
X10o3
C=51
0 .001 .002 , .003 .004 .005
SLIT WIDTH
FIGURE 7-6 STREAMING DOSE IN THREE YEARS
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8.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
8.1 PROGRAM SUMMARY
The energetic electrons and protons of the earth's radiation belts,
and solar protons comprise the penetrating radiation environment of
principal concern for the IUE spacecraft. This environment is suffi-
ciently severe to cause a significant possibility of interference,
degradation, or failure for unprotected or sensitive items. Hence,
the IUE radiation and shielding study was conducted to assess radiation
degradation on all IUE parts and materials, identify and plan necessary
radiation tests, and determine shielding requirements for radiation
sensitive parts and materials.
The inputs used for this program were the spacecraft description,
design information, and trajectory definition. The following tasks
were performed: the radiation environment levels were defined in
terms suitable for vulnerability analysis; screening was performed
to identify those materials and components that are not significantly
degraded by the radiation environment; the remaining materials and
components were analyzed in greater detail. The performance of
detailed circuit analysis was not within the scope of this program.
The classes of items receiving emphasis were semiconductor devices,
optical sensors, and materials. The IUE semiconductors were organized
by subsystem and component into categories and problem areas identified.
The optical sensors were analyzed for degradation of critical elements
and interference. The IUE materials were classified by generic-material
failure threshold and the application and location of the materials
was examined to permit identification of problem areas.
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8.1 (Continued)
The failure thresholds for generic categories of piece-parts and
materials were used as a basis for the establishment of permissable
internal-environment levels for the associated spacecraft component.
Potential exceptions to the categorization were defined to the extent
possible.
The existing shielding was determined, and the additional shielding
required to provide the required internal environment was calculated.
8.2 RESULTS
8.2.1 Materials Analysis
No materials (excluding optics) were considered significantly suscep-
tible except for acrylics (adhesives), teflon, and the hydrazine tank
diaphragm. The acrylics and teflon are considered possibly suscep-
tible only if operated under a large, long-term mechanical load where
cracking, separation, or crumbling could cause a critical failure.
The hydrazine tank diaphragm is probably not susceptible, but its
function is sufficiently critical to merit test if small changes in
its parameters are important to its function. In addition, the heat
dump resistor adhesive may merit testing in a radiation environment.
The absorptanceof the metallized FEP teflon thermal blanket may
increase to a value as large as 0.20. The hydrazine decomposition
from radiation is small.
Severe darkening for several optical glasses has been reported for
dose levels equivalent to that expected on IUE. Cerium stabilized
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8.2.1 (Continued)
glasses are significantly less vulnerable. There is large variability
in vulnerability between different compositions of glass. The specific
glass composition in particular applications is not very accessible.
In conjunction with the requirements for protection against inter-
ference in the optical sensors as well as darkening of the transmission
optics, shielding may be required. Radiation tests of the particular
glasses used in IUE will determine if the damage threshold for darken-
ing is significantly above 104 rad (Si).
8.2.2 Semiconductor Analysis
The assessment of the IUE electronics is based on.piece-parts vulner-
ability. Piece-part types have been categorized according to the
types of construction which bear some relationship to their general
response to radiation. Wide variability in radiation response within
part types reduces accuracy of such a categorization. The intent of
such a categorization is to permit establishment of reasonable lower
limits on environment levels likely to cause failure for each piece-
part category. Hence the categories of piece-parts used in particular
system components provide the basis for setting reasonable values for
the vulnerability threshold of those components.
Detailed circuit analysis to determine specific margins and electrical-
failure criteria for each circuit application of the piece-parts is
out of the scope of this analysis effort. This effort involved no
test performance.
A "sure-safe" dose level for semiconductors would be less than 103 rad
(Si). Such a level is impractical for IUE, particularly when the 95
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8.2.2 (Continued)
percent solar proton dose is considered. However, only a small
fraction of device types have such a low failure threshold.
The choice of the failure threshold of 104 rad (Si) for bipolar tran-
sistors, bipolar linear integrated circuits, and digital MOS integrated
circuits is supported by the available data. However, a small but not
negligible risk is taken by the assumption of this threshold level
without the performance of at least sample radiation testing on the
particular IUE device types in these categories.
Bipolar digital ICs of the general type used on IUE have failure
thresholds in excess of 107 rad (Si).
The SCR and UJT devices require testing. Displacement damage (from
protons) for the individual bipolar types has been predicted, and a
few types are indicated for which damage may be significant.
Displacement damage is not considered to be significant for the
remaining device categories for the IUE environment.
The LVDT (Linear Voltage Displacement Transducer), the Hall devices,
and the Mechanism Electronics were examined. The Hall devices were
not vulnerable. The existing LVDT structure was found to provide
shielding to 104 rad (Si).
8.2.3 Sensor Analyses
Damage and interference effects were examined in the MgF2 window, the
P11 phospher and the fiber optic window of the UV converter tube, the
KCZ target and window of the SEC vidicon for the spectrograph and
acquisition cameras, and the Fine Error Sensor.
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Essentially no damage is expected to the P11 phospher. The darkening
in the MgF2 window without additional shielding is probably significant.
Insufficient data was found to establish the dominant damage mechanism
for the KCR target. The major source of interference was found to be
Cerenkov radiation produced in the transmission optics. This inter-
ference is likely to be significant.
Tests to resolve the sensor radiation response uncertainties are
recommended. A detailed test plan for the sensors was prepared. The
results of the sensor tests will permit the design of appropriate
shields and baffles for the sensors.
8.2.4 Other Spacecraft Experience
Spacecraft charging effects from space radiation have been shown to
cause significant interference for certain spacecraft design configura-
tions.
The S3 MOSDAM experiment was analyzed to evaluate the possibility that
long-term annealing may reduce the vulnerability of spacecraft elec-
tronics. However, the indications of annealing that were found are
insufficiently large or consistent to permit annealing to be considered
of significant benefit.
The COMSAT program was found to include a reasonably thorough radiation
effects design and test approach.
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8.2.5 Detailed Shielding Calculations
The method used to perform the shielding calculations for this study
considers both the shielding provided by the immediately surrounding
material and the shadowing provided by nearby objects, with suitable
simplifying assumptions.
The failure thresholds for generic categories of piece-parts and
materials were used as a basis for the establishment of permissable
internal-environment levels for the associated component. The
existing shielding was determined, and the additional shielding
required to provide several different selected internal environments
were calculated.
The dose depth profile used for the shielding calculations was the
3-year belt electron dose plus the 3-year nominal solar proton dose
The additional shielding thicknesses were calculated for levels from
this dose depth profile of 5 X 103 rad (Si), 104 rad (Si), and 5 X 104
rad (Si).
Shield thicknesses for each side of every component or component stack
were calculated.
-The shielding thicknesses corresponding to 5 X 103 rad (Si) dose are
recommended for all system components except those for which specific
data permits setting higher levels. This shielding level allows for
a small additional bremsstrahlung dose and the possibility of solar
proton dose in excess of the nominal level. Adding in bremsstrahlung
and using the 95 percent proton dose, the total dose is<lO04 rad (Si).
The semiconductor threshold has been established as>10 4 rad (Si).
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8.2.5 (Continued)
An investigation of shield material choices was made, and aluminum
was determined to be best for the recommended internal environment
level. If decreased weight and consequent greater risk is necessary,
sufficient data are provided to permit the choice of the optimum shield
material for any desired internal environment.
The basic safety factors in the choice of an internal environment are:
1) the solar proton criteria is approximately a 95 percent upper limit;
and is about three times a predicted mean value, 2) the possibility of
long-term annealing of the semiconductor damage, and 3) slight conser-
vatism in the shielding calculations as a result of using the spherical
shielding values.
These safety factors are balanced by the significant possibilities of
the existence of unusually radiation-sensitive components or small
circuit design margins in critical applications which are undetected
because of the limited scope of this study, as well as uncertainties
in predicted belt environment levels.
The additional shielding thicknesses for 5 X 103 rad (Si) are in the
neighborhood of 0.125-inch Al. If the shielding is done by adding
shielding external to each component or component stack, the additional
shield weight is approximately 60 pounds. Consequently, detailed
consideration of specific piece-part vulnerability for particular
applications, shielding provided by existing internal structure in
components, and the addition of spot shielding are recommended to
provide significant weight savings.
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8.2.5 (Continued)
Calculations of the dose accumulated from electrons streaming through
a narrow crack were made. The results indicate that tight tolerance
must be maintained on mating surfaces of components in a component
stack to preserve shielding integrity.
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